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Abstract 
This study seeks to enhance the understanding of ASEAN’s external preferential trade agreements 
(PTA) in context of the recent growth of economic regionalism in East Asia. First, the paper compares 
the content of ASEAN’s five plurilateral PTAs with China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New 
Zealand with the status quo of ASEAN’s internal economic integration. In a second step, the paper 
compares ASEAN’s plurilateral agreements and ASEAN’s internal integration with the content of six 
bilateral PTAs that individual ASEAN member states have concluded with Japan. The empirical 
findings demonstrate that the ambition of ASEAN’s five plurilateral agreements finds its upper limits 
in the substantive content of ASEAN’s internal economic integration. Within these limits, the 
coverage and depth of commitments varies considerably in correlation with the intensity of trade 
between ASEAN and the respective external partner. Moreover, the comparison shows that bilateral 
PTAs between six individual ASEAN member states and Japan go significantly beyond the status quo 
of ASEAN’s internal integration and exceed the coverage and depth of ASEAN’s external plurilateral 
PTAs. The author contends that the coverage and depth of ASEAN member states’ plurilateral PTAs 
is limited by the structural heterogeneity of the signatories and, as a result, a relatively high diversity 
of policy preferences. Bilateral PTAs between ASEAN member states and the same external partners 
result in deeper commitments than the plurilateral accords, because of both a higher common 
denominator among the parties to the agreements and the free-rider problem that persists in plurilateral 
negotiation settings. Moreover, it is argued that the coverage and depth of the agreements is a function 
of the intensity of trade among the parties: high trade intensity results in deeper and more 
comprehensive agreements that tackle 21st century trade issues, whereas low trade intensity results in 
shallow agreements that aim to reduce first-generation trade barriers. These hypotheses, which are 
fully verified by the empirical findings of this study, allow for important conclusions about the role of 
ASEAN member states - collectively and individually - in current and future economic integration 
initiatives such as ASEAN+6, the TPP, or EU – ASEAN PTA negotiations. 
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ASEAN, Japan, East Asia, regional economic integration, preferential trade agreement, free trade 
agreement, economic partnership, plurilateral, bilateral, trade intensity, WTO 
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BEYOND MARKET ACCESS? 
THE ANATOMY OF ASEAN’S PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
David Kleimann* 
I. Introduction 
The recent surge of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is fast reshaping the architecture of the world 
trading system and the trading environment. As of end-2010, WTO members have notified 278 PTAs, 
around half of which have come into force during the last 15 years.1 The nature and content of 
regional agreements is also evolving rapidly.2 One important dimension of more recent PTAs is their 
increasingly comprehensive scope, which frequently includes treatment of border regulatory measures 
such as trade facilitation and standards, and complex behind-the-border regulatory issues, such as 
competition policy, investment policy, government procurement, and intellectual property. These 
policies are often not covered in the current WTO rulebook, nor are they on the table in the now dead-
in-all-but-name Doha negotiations.3 
Booming East Asia has been particularly active in negotiating intraregional and interregional trade and 
investment agreements during the past decade. With only three PTAs on record by the year 2000, 58 
bilateral or plurilateral accords that involve at least one Asian nation as a signatory have entered into 
force since then.4  
On the first sight, East Asian intraregional economic integration through PTAs appears to have created 
a considerable amount of chaos through the overlap of membership and substantive obligations of the 
agreements concerned - much rather than legal certainty and predictability for businesses.  
                                                     
* David Kleimann is a Researcher at the Law Department of the European University Institute in Florence and a 
graduate from the World Trade Institute in Berne. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments 
from Petros Mavroidis, Marise Cremona, and Joris Larik on an earlier draft. All remaining errors are the 
author’s alone. The paper was prepared for the ‘ASEAN Integration Through Law: The ASEAN Way in a 
Comparative Context’ project, which is one of the major research activities of the Centre for International 
Law (CIL) at the National University of Singapore (NUS). The ASEAN ITL research project examines the 
role of law and the rule of law in Asian legal integration. The project involves over 70 researchers from Asia 
and around the world. The outcomes of the project are expected to support the efforts of ASEAN member 
states to achieve the ASEAN Community. The Co-Directors of the project are Professor Joseph Weiler 
(NYU and NUS Law Schools) and Professor Michael Ewing-Chow (NUS Law School) with Executive 
Director Dr Tan Hsien-Li (Centre for International Law). The project directors kindly agreed to the 
publication of this paper in the EUI Law Department’s Working Paper Series. A later version of the paper 
will form part of a forthcoming ASEAN ITL monograph, titled ‘Collectively ASEAN: An Inventory and 
Typology of ASEAN External Agreements’, co-authored by Professor Marise Cremona, David Kleimann, 
Joris Larik, Rena Lee, and Professor Pascal Vennesson, and published by Cambridge University Press. 
Further information on the ASEAN ITL project is available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/research-projects/cil-
research-projects/asean/. 
1 WTO (2011): The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements – From Coexistence to Coherence, World Trade 
Report 2011, Geneva. p.55 
2 For an overview of recent developments in economic regionalism, see: Chauffour, Jean-Pierre & Maur, Jean-
Christophe (2010): Beyond Market Access, in: Chauffour, Jean-Pierre & Maur, Jean-Christophe (eds.): 
‘Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development – A Handbook’, World Bank, Washington D.C.. 
3 WTO (2011): op. cit. pp. 128-133  
4 We narrowly define ‘Asia’ as the ten ASEAN member states plus China, India, Japan, and Korea. 
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At the centre of what has been labeled the East Asian ‘noodle bowl’, ASEAN internal economic 
integration has steadily progressed since the conclusion of the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) in 1992 and is 
now geared towards the achievement of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2016.  
The second layer of regional obligations was created by the conclusion of plurilateral PTAs between 
ASEAN member states and six of ASEAN’s dialogue partners, notably China (entry into force: 2005), 
Korea (2007), Japan (2008), India (2010), as well as Australia and New Zealand (2010). Due to their 
plurilateral character, these ASEAN+1 PTAs also bind ASEAN member states inter se.  
Adding a third layer of regional integration, ASEAN’s six external PTA partners have concluded, or 
are in the process of negotiating, separate and parallel PTAs with up to seven individual ASEAN 
member states. Furthermore, these countries have - outside the realm of ASEAN member states’ 
involvement - concluded PTAs among each other – the latest incident of which is the announcement of 
trilateral negotiations between China, Korea, and Japan. At the same time, all of the actors mentioned 
above have been actively engaged in the negotiation of PTAs with other Asian and non-Asian 
economies. 
What completes the initial confusion regarding the direction of East Asian economic integration is the 
recent initiation of ASEAN+6 PTA talks, i.e. negotiations that include all ASEAN member states and 
the six ASEAN+1 partners under one umbrella, as well as the ongoing negotiations of a transpacific 
partnership PTA (TPP), which involve four ASEAN member states (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam), the NAFTA signatories, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Peru, Chile and (likely to 
join soon) Japan. 
This seemingly erratic negotiation behavior raises important questions with regard to the overall 
process of East Asian economic integration, which we limit, due to the scope of this paper, to an 
inquiry concerning the role of ASEAN member states in that process: how does ASEAN internal 
economic integration relate to the scope and depth of ASEAN+1 PTAs? For what reasons do 
ASEAN+1 external partners negotiate parallel and separate PTAs with individual ASEAN member 
states? Do these parallel agreements achieve broader and deeper commitments than ASEAN+1 PTAs, 
and if so, why? How do parallel agreements compare to the status quo of ASEAN internal economic 
integration? What do respective findings tell us about ASEAN and its member states as actors in the 
process of East Asian regional integration and what are the implications for their endeavour towards 
the conclusion of an ASEAN+6 PTA? Finally, how do ASEAN’s external liberalization and 
integration initiatives relate and compare to the potential outcome of TPP negotiations? 
With a view to addressing these questions, this paper aims to locate ASEAN’s five plurilateral PTAs, 
which its member states have collectively concluded with external partners, within the broader cosmos 
of contemporary PTAs. In our analysis, we draw particular attention, first, to the broader question of 
whether ASEAN+1 accords match the recent global trend towards more comprehensive economic 
agreements, i.e. whether the agreements go beyond mere market access disciplines in terms of their 
issue area coverage, by including WTO-plus and WTO-extra disciplines on customs, standards, 
competition, investment, government procurement, intellectual property, labor mobility etc. This 
analysis is confined to two questions: on a horizontal level, we inquire whether specific policy areas 
are covered by the agreements by some kind of legal provision, or not. Respective findings, however, 
do not allow for any conclusions about the legal quality of these provisions, i.e. whether they are of 
substantive or procedural nature, and whether they are legally enforceable (hard and specific legal 
language, subject to dispute settlement procedures) or not. Subsequently, we determine the legal 
enforceability of the covered provisions: we distinguish between soft legal language, hard legal 
provisions that are exempted from a PTAs dispute settlement procedures, and hard law that is subject 
to dispute settlement. We shall extensively refer to the sources of this methodology and respective 
findings further below and in section V. 
Secondly, we scrutinize the intensity and depth of the de jure integration provided by the agreements. 
In other words, to mention two extreme scenarios, we inquire whether, and to what extent, the 
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agreements codify hard and specific legal disciplines in the policy areas covered by the agreement, 
which require implementing measures on the national or regional level to comply with the accord, or 
whether and to what extent the parties instead opted for a more shallow approach by mandating future 
cooperation and negotiations among the parties on particular issues by means of cooperation clauses - 
so-called ‘living agreement instruments’. We shall further refine the analytical concepts used in this 
analysis in section V. 
Using the analytical concepts of legal coverage and depth of PTAs, third, we examine to what extent 
ASEAN’s external PTAs mirror the status quo of ASEAN’s internal economic integration and where, 
if at all, they go beyond the ASEAN acquis. 
Fourth, we compare the legal coverage and depth of ASEAN’s PTAs with six PTAs that individual 
ASEAN member states have concluded with Japan in parallel - notably Japan’s agreement with 
Singapore (entry into force: 2002), Malaysia (2006), Thailand (2007), Indonesia (2008), the 
Philippines (2008), and Viet Nam (2009). Our expectation is that this comparison allows for 
conclusions as to why several external partners, which have recently concluded a PTA with ASEAN 
members collectively, are seeking to negotiate and conclude separate PTAs with individual ASEAN 
member states at the same time. The results of this investigation are also expected to contribute to an 
explanation as to why the European Union has recently decided to negotiate PTAs with individual 
ASEAN member states, instead of negotiating with ASEAN member states collectively. 
By shedding light on these four dimensions of ASEAN+1 PTAs, we seek to enhance the 
understanding of the nature of these accords as a legal phenomenon of contemporary East Asian 
economic integration, and of ASEAN member states as actors in that very process. We do so against 
the background of an overview of ASEAN’s de jure economic integration (section II) and a brief 
discussion of ASEAN+1 PTAs in context of the general growth of East Asian regionalism in the past 
decade (section III). 
In section IV, we examine factors that potentially explain the substantive coverage and depth of 
ASEAN+1 PTA commitments, notably, among others, the ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘proximity’ of 
contracting parties as well as the intensity of trade between them. As a result of that discussion, we 
develop the hypothesis that ASEAN’s PTAs with external partners likely do not exceed, both in terms 
coverage and depth, the status quo of ASEAN’s intraregional de jure integration. Secondly, we argue 
that the coverage and depth of de jure integration through ASEAN’s PTAs is contingent on the level 
of trade interdependence between ASEAN and its external partners. ASEAN’s PTAs with low 
intensity trade partners are expected to be particularly shallow market access agreements. ASEAN’s 
PTAs with high intensity trade partners, however, are likely to resemble the coverage and depth of the 
ASEAN acquis, and, in areas that are not covered by ASEAN internal de jure integration, establish a 
plurilateral cooperation and negotiation platform with a view to the development of legal disciplines in 
these areas in the future. Third, we contend that ASEAN+1 external partners are likely to negotiate 
separate agreements with advanced individual ASEAN member states with whom they have intensive 
trade relationships in order to overcome the ‘lowest common denominator’ and ‘free-rider’ problem of 
the ASEAN+1 plurilateral negotiation setting and to achieve more comprehensive and deeper legal 
treatment of 21st century trade issues. Therefore, these parallel and separate PTAs are likely to 
significantly go beyond the coverage and depth of ASEAN+1 PTAs. 
We shall test these hypotheses in section V by examining both the coverage and depth of ASEAN+1 
PTAs in comparison with the ASEAN status quo and in comparison with Japan’s parallel PTAs with 
six individual ASEAN member states. For the analysis of the substantive coverage of PTAs, we use 
the methodology developed by Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir (HMS).5 For the examination of the depth 
of PTA commitments in a number of select policy areas, we use the Asian Development Bank’s 
                                                     
5 Horn, Hendrik & Mavroidis, Petros & Sapir, André (2009): Beyond the WTO – An Anatomy of US and EU 
Preferential Trade Agreements, BRUEGEL Blueprint 7, Brussels. 
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Regional Integration Center’s Comparative FTA Toolkit.6 Finally, we discuss the policy implications 
of our findings and conclude the paper in section VI. 
II. ASEAN Economic Integration through Law – A Point of Reference for ASEAN’s 
Preferential Trade Agreements 
In the following, we briefly take stock of ASEAN’s main economic integration and cooperation 
efforts. We do so with the presumption that the extent of ASEAN’s internal economic integration 
serves as an important benchmark for ASEAN member states’ ability and willingness to take on 
commitments vis-à-vis external partners and vis-à-vis each other by means of concluding ASEAN+1 
plurilateral agreements. 
As a latecomer in regional economic integration, East and Southeast Asia, now finds itself at the 
centre of the current dynamic and fast paced process towards deeper regional and inter-regional 
economic integration around the globe. ASEAN established itself as a frontrunner in Asian trade 
liberalization by concluding East Asia’s first PTA in 1992 – the ASEAN FTA (AFTA). AFTA, 
however, as a conventional market access agreement, only covered the reduction of tariffs on trade in 
goods, and originally only bound the six founding ASEAN members.7 The new ASEAN members 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam (CLMV) signed the agreement upon their accession to 
ASEAN and were subject to more generous transition periods than the original signatories. Tariff 
reductions were further consolidated by subsequently adopted protocols and the 2009 ASEAN 
Agreement on Trade and Goods (ATIGA), which we discuss further below.8 
AFTA uses a negative list approach with an ambitious 0% target for all tariff lines. The Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme allows countries to maintain a temporary exclusion list 
(TEL), sensitive list (SL), and general exclusion list (EL). Commodities are phased into the inclusion 
list (IL) gradually, with a longer transition period for CLMV. ASEAN-6 reached the 0–5 % average 
tariff target under AFTA in 2003, Viet Nam in 2006, Laos, Myanmar in 2008, and Cambodia in 2010.9 
Overall, average tariff rate protection of the ASEAN-6 has reached a level of 1.5%, down from 12.8% 
in 1993. ASEAN-6 countries have now completely eliminated tariff protection on 99.11% of tariff 
lines.10 What remains for ASEAN-6 countries is the protection of highly sensitive sectors, such as 
food crops (rice, sugar), the steel industry, or, in some countries, the automotive sector.11 As of today, 
49.27% of CLMV’s tariff lines are at a zero percent duty rate. These four countries are expected to 
complete the tariff elimination process by 2015, which is when, impressively, nearly 100% of all tariff 
protection in the entire ASEAN region will have been dismantled on a preferential basis. 
It is noteworthy, in this context, that close to 90% of preferences under AFTA have progressively been 
multilateralized by ASEAN member states. In this way, ASEAN’s plurilateral tariff liberalization 
program has significantly contributed to opening the region to global trade in a faster fashion than 
                                                     
6 The ADB’s Regional Integration Centre’s Comparative FTA Toolkit can be accessed at 
http://aric.adb.org/comparisonftacontent.php. 
7 Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  
8 For a detailed breakdown of the evolution of the AFTA’s Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) see: 
http://www.aseansec.org/19585.htm 
9 Zhang, Yunling & Shen, Minghui (2011): The Status of East Asian Free Trade Agreements, ADBI Working 
Paper Series, No.282, Asian Development Bank Institute,Tokyo. p11 
10 Malaysia’s Ministry of Trade and Industry Trade Portal, at: 
http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.section.Section_8de83760-7f000010-72f772f7-
f5047602  
11 Hill, Hal & Menon, Jayant (2010): ASEAN Economic Integration – Features, Fulfillments, Failures, and the 
Future, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 69, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila. p22 
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would have been achieved through GATT and WTO negotiations.12 The multilateralization of AFTA 
tariff reductions also explains the fact that utilization rates of AFTA preferences have fallen 
dramatically over the years.  
The remaining 10% of all tariff lines, which have not been multilateralized yet, however, provide 
plenty of policy space for the protection of sensitive sectors from competition from non-ASEAN 
economies and, at the same time, set incentives for non-ASEAN governments to negotiate preferential 
tariffs with ASEAN member states bilaterally or plurilaterally. ASEAN tariff data compiled by Mikic 
(2009), for instance, shows that not only ASEAN member states’ bound MFN tariff rates but, more 
importantly, average weighed applied tariffs evidently discriminate against imports from the rest of the 
world. The author, moreover, reveals the significant number of applied tariff peaks that ASEAN 
member states apply to imports from non-ASEAN economies.13 
The coverage of ASEAN’s economic integration agreements further expanded in the coming years. 
Shortly after AFTA came into force, ASEAN member states concluded framework agreements on 
services liberalization (1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Trade in Services - AFAS), 
cooperation on intellectual property rights (1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Cooperation, investment (1998 ASEAN Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment 
Area - AIA), and mutual recognition of conformity assessment (1998 ASEAN Framework Agreement 
on Mutual Recognition Arrangements). 
As the term ‘framework agreement’ indicates, these accords, as a starting point, initially only 
established a platform for cooperation and general principles for the negotiation of further 
commitments and rules, to be agreed upon in the future. For instance, AFAS subsequently resulted in 
eight negotiation rounds in the region and respective eight ‘packages’ of commitments.14 Similarly, 
ASEAN has, under AFAS, concluded mutual recognition agreements (MRA) on engineering services 
(2005), nursing (2006), architectural services (2007), surveying qualifications (2007), and accountancy 
services (2008), as well as medical practitioners (2009), with an MRA on tourism services currently in 
the making.15 Furthermore, ASEAN members adopted first sectoral MRAs on conformity assessment 
for the goods sectors of electrical and electronic equipment (2002) and medicinal products  (2009). 
ASEAN members have also made first experiences with the drafting of harmonized regulatory 
regimes in the sectors of cosmetics (2003) as well as electrical and electronic equipment (2005). 
Furthermore, ASEAN members have concluded landmark agreements in the areas of customs reform 
(1997 ASEAN Agreement on Customs; 2005 ASEAN Agreement to Establish and Implement the 
ASEAN Single Window) and dispute settlement (2004 Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement). 
2004 also saw the conclusion of an agreement on the integration of priority sectors (2004 ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on the Integration of Priority Sectors). This agreement essentially bundles 
commitments governing various areas of trade policy (goods, services, customs, investment, standards, 
conformity assessment etc.) with a view to accelerating integration in specified sectors, such as 
agricultural products, fisheries, air travel, automotives, electronics, healthcare, textiles, and tourism. 
In 2009, building on the 1998 AIA, member states signed the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement, which covers liberalization, protection, facilitation, and promotion of investment and pays 
tribute to the enormous importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. 
                                                     
12 ibid.: p7 
13 Mikic, Mia (2009): ASEAN and Trade Integration, UN ESCAP Trade and Investment Division Staff Working 
Paper 1/09, Bangkok. pp13-14 
14 ASEAN (2011): ASEAN Integration in Trade in Services: Development, Challenges, and Way Forward, 
ASEAN Secretariat Paper, presented at ADBI-PECC Conference on “Strategies to Enhance Competitiveness and 
Facilitate Regional Trade and Investment in Services” Hong Kong, China, 1-3 June 2011. p7  
15 ibid.: p9 
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Table 1: Milestones of ASEAN Economic Integration through Law 
 
 
Finally, at the 14th ASEAN Summit in early 2009, ASEAN leaders reconfirmed their commitment to 
“achieve free flow of goods in ASEAN as one of the principal means to establish a single market and 
production base for the deeper economic integration of the region towards the realisation of the AEC 
Date of 
Conclusion 
Agreement  
  
1992 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
  
1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Trade in Services (AFAS) 
  
 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation 
  
1997 ASEAN Agreement on Customs 
  
1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) 
  
 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition Arrangements 
  
2002 ASEAN Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Conformity Assessment 
Procedures for Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
  
2003 Agreement on the ASEAN Harmonized Cosmetic Regulatory Regime 
  
2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
  
 ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Integration of Priority Sectors 
  
2005 Agreement to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window 
  
 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Engineering Services 
  
 Agreement on the ASEAN Harmonized Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
Regulatory Regime 
  
2006 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Nursing Services 
  
2007 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Architectural Services 
  
 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Surveying Qualifications 
  
2008 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Accountancy Services  
  
2009 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Medical Practitioners 
  
 ASEAN Sectoral Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Good Manufacturing 
Practice (GMP) Inspection of Manufacturers of Medicinal Products  
  
 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
  
 ASEAN Agreement on Trade in Goods (ATIGA) 
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by 2015” and signed the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA). The ATIGA consolidates all 
existing ASEAN economic integration initiatives related to trade in goods and legally integrates the 
agreements into one comprehensive framework. In addition to the chapter on tariff liberalization and 
rules of origin, ATIGA contains chapters on non-tariff measures, trade facilitation, customs, standards, 
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, as well as trade remedy measures. 
The ATIGA includes a binding and specific obligation to progressively eliminate non-tariff barriers to 
intra-regional trade, to harmonize or ‘align’ standards across the region, and further develop 
harmonized regulatory regimes. Importantly, the agreement also establishes the institutional 
infrastructure and associated mandates necessary to achieve these objectives. 
As such, since 1992, ASEAN has made, at least on paper, significant steps towards deeper regional 
economic integration beyond mere market access liberalization. The agreements listed above make for 
important milestones towards the achievement of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2016. 
However, ASEAN’s regional integration through legal agreements has important gaps in terms of 
policy area coverage and depth of commitments. First and foremost, ASEAN has never established a 
common external tariff and is unlikely to do so in the near future. Competition policy, moreover, is 
one of several prominent carve-outs in terms of behind-the-border policies. The ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint calls, in aspirational language for the enactment of competition laws in all 
ASEAN member states by 2015, which can be deemed, as a matter of appropriate sequencing, a 
prerequisite for cooperation on and integration of competition policies at the regional level. So far, 
however, only five member states have enacted competition laws - notably Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Similarly, the development of regional rules and cooperation on 
government procurement has not taken place at all. Yet another area, in which regional integration 
through substantive legal disciplines has been largely absent is intellectual property rights, where 
member states have merely declared their intention to foster cooperation between national IPR offices 
and build institutional capacity. 
III. ASEAN’s Preferential Trade Agreements in Context of East Asian Growth in 
Regionalism 
Following the pioneering integration efforts by ASEAN, Asia (for our purposes narrowly defined as 
ASEAN member states plus China, India, Japan, and Korea) experienced a massive growth in 
negotiations and the conclusion of PTAs, which is unprecedented in the history of global regionalism. 
In the period of 2000 to November 2012, the number of PTAs that include at least one Asian economy 
as a signatory increased from only 3 to 58 agreements,16 with a plethora of PTAs either proposed or 
currently under negotiation.17  
Additional to China (with 12 PTAs), India (13 PTAs), Japan (13 PTAs), and Korea (10 PTAs), 
ASEAN member states have played an important role in this process. ASEAN member states have 
concluded, respectively, 17 (Singapore), 12 (Thailand), 11 (Malaysia), 8 (Brunei Darussalam and 
Laos), 7 (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam), and 6 (Cambodia and Myanmar) PTAs up until 
today.18 For each ASEAN member, these figures include AFTA/ATIGA and the 5 ASEAN+1 FTAs 
that ASEAN has concluded with external partners as a common negotiator. The numbers indicate that 
some ASEAN members have been highly active in pursuing their own economic integration objectives 
                                                     
16 This figure avoids double-counting the individual country FTAs that are listed further below. 
17 Asian Development Bank: FTA database. Accessible at: http://aric.adb.org/ftatrends.php  
18 ibid. 
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(such as Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia), while others have entirely relied on ASEAN’s capacity 
as a common negotiator (Cambodia and Myanmar). ASEAN+1 PTAs, i.e. PTAs that ASEAN member 
states have collectively negotiated as plurilateral agreements with non-ASEAN partner countries, have 
been concluded with the People’s Republic of China (entry into force: January 2005), the Republic of 
Korea (June 2010), Japan (December 2008), India (January 2010), and a joint agreement with 
Australia and New Zealand (January 2010). All of these accords can be associated, in terms of timing 
of their negotiation and conclusion, with the latest global ‘wave’ of regionalism.19 
With these agreements, ASEAN has, on the first sight, established itself as a hub for economic 
agreements within the Asia-Pacific region. However, the fact that ASEAN member states have 
concluded, and are in the process of negotiating, a larger number of PTAs with the very same external 
partners individually and in parallel points at a considerable limitation of the significance of ASEAN 
as an external negotiator. Japan has concluded PTAs with seven ASEAN members in parallel to its 
negotiations with ASEAN as a bloc, which came into force between 2002 and 2009. New Zealand 
concluded three PTAs with individual ASEAN members (Singapore, entry into force in 2001; 
Thailand, 2005; Malaysia, 2010). India (Singapore, 2001; Malaysia, 2011) and Australia (Singapore, 
2003; Thailand, 2005) both concluded two individual accords with ASEAN countries, with Australia 
currently negotiating with Malaysia and Indonesia. Korea (2006) and China (2009) both sealed a deal 
with Singapore, whereas Korea is now in the process of negotiating PTAs with Vietnam and 
Indonesia. 
The recently announced pause of EU-ASEAN PTA negotiations and the subsequent EU decision to 
negotiate PTAs with ASEAN member states individually further justifies skepticism with respect to 
ASEAN’s potency as a collective PTA negotiator. We discuss the potential reasons for the conclusion 
of parallel agreements between individual ASEAN member states and ASEAN+1 partners in the 
following section. In a nutshell, we consider that those individual ASEAN member states that are 
more advanced in terms of economic and institutional development may feel comfortable with 
negotiating more comprehensive and deeper commitments with non-ASEAN partner countries, 
whereas others may lack the institutional and economic preparedness to conclude agreements that 
would commit them to complex and demanding behind-the-border reforms that have not yet been 
achieved domestically or regionally in the context of ASEAN economic integration. We test this 
hypothesis in section V by comparing the substantive coverage and depth of commitments of 
ASEAN+1 PTAs with a sample of six PTAs that individual ASEAN member states have concluded 
with Japan. In the now following section, we examine factors that may determine the coverage and 
depth of ASEAN+1 PTAs. 
  
                                                     
19 WTO (2011): op. cit. p53 
Beyond Market Access? The Anatomy of ASEAN’s Preferential Trade Agreements 
9 
IV. Factors explaining Substantive Coverage and Depth of de jure Economic 
Integration in ASEAN’s PTAs 
In this section, we examine several factors that may explain the substantive coverage and depth of de 
jure integration in ASEAN+1 agreements. We first discuss the concepts of ‘heterogeneity’ and 
‘proximity’ of contracting parties as potential explanatory factors. Subsequently, we turn to an 
examination of the causal relationship between de jure and de facto economic integration in East Asia. 
1. Heterogeneity and Proximity 
Kelley (2010) argues, in regard of the process of East Asian economic integration, that the realm of 
commonly assumed obligations among multiple parties is determined by their heterogeneity in terms 
of policy preferences, which are, in turn, a function of variables such as regime type, commonly 
shared beliefs, and degree of economic development and capacity.20 Hamanaka (2010) purports that, 
in a scenario of multiple highly heterogeneous potential parties to an agreement, negotiators face a 
trade-off between an inclusive membership approach, on the one hand, and more comprehensive and 
deeper commitments, on the other.21  
In the scholarly literature on economic integration, Kelley’s and Hamanaka’s hypotheses, which 
advance ‘heterogeneity’ as a determinant of the scope and depth of common obligations, translates 
into the consideration of ‘proximity’ factors: notwithstanding the absolute potential benefits of de jure 
convergence and integration, policy-makers are likely to factor adjustment costs into their assessment 
of the necessary depth as well as geographic and material scope of convergence and integration. 
Adjustment costs tend to be low in cases of close ‘proximity’ between the partner countries in terms of 
factors such as geography, language, levels of development, legal systems, institutional compatibility, 
policy objectives, and regulatory preferences. Adjustment costs tend to be high for countries, on the 
other hand, where convergence would require the deviation from a national standard that optimally 
reflects domestic policy preferences and implementation capacities.22 
As a general observation, ASEAN member states are highly diverse in terms of economic and 
institutional development and capacity, economic structures and resource endowments, economic 
specialization, legal systems, regulatory quality, ease of doing business, demography, languages etc. In 
consideration of all of the before-mentioned variables, some authors conclude that ASEAN is likely 
the most diverse region in the world.23 Grounded on the general observation of highly diverging socio-
economic indicators, we find it safe to assume that ASEAN member states have highly diverging 
policy preferences and needs with regard to the breadth and depth of de jure economic integration - 
both intra-regionally and through plurilateral agreements with non-ASEAN countries. Furthermore, it 
is safe to assume that the evolving status quo of ASEAN de jure integration (the ASEAN acquis) 
mirrors the lowest common denominator, in terms of policy preferences, among a set of highly diverse 
ASEAN member states. 
                                                     
20 Kelley, Judith (2010): The Role of Membership Rules in Regional Organizations, ADB Working Paper Series 
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21 Hamanaka, Shintaro (2010): Institutional Parameters of a Region-Wide Economic Agreement in Asia: 
Examination of Trans-Pacific Partnership and ASEAN+X Free Trade Agreement Approaches, ADB 
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Jean-Pierre & Maur, Jean-Christophe (eds.): ‘Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development – A 
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For our purposes, the ASEAN acquis thereby becomes an important substantive benchmark for the 
assessment of ASEAN+1 PTAs. In accordance with the consideration of heterogeneity and proximity 
as factors determining substantive coverage and depth of integration, our working hypothesis is that 
ASEAN member states, collectively, do not commit to obligations in ASEAN+1 agreements that go 
beyond the ASEAN acquis. In other words, ASEAN+1 agreements are unlikely to provide for hard 
legal obligations and the creation of institutions in areas where common commitments, rules, and 
institutions have not yet been established intra-regionally or nationally in all ASEAN member states 
likewise. In policy areas where common commitments, rules, and institutions are absent, the 
agreements are likely to mandate, at most, future cooperation and/or negotiations among ASEAN 
member states and the third country party, and will avoid substantive and specific hard legal 
disciplines that go beyond the status quo of ASEAN de jure integration. 
We, furthermore, follow Gilligan (2004) in the assumption that the trade-off between heterogeneity of 
parties to an agreement and substantive coverage and depth of commitments is diminished, where the 
technical modalities of the codification of obligations allow for a differentiation of commitments 
among the parties and thereby allow for the incorporation of diverging policy preferences.24 
Differentiated legal disciplines are easy to provide for by means of liberalization schedules for tariffs 
and services sectors. Country specific tariff reduction and liberalization schedules can allow for 
differentiated treatment of ASEAN members vis-à-vis the external partner and vis-à-vis each other. 
What remains, however, is the ‘free-rider’ problem: parties to an agreement that would generally be 
willing to make stronger commitments will be hesitant to do so if these concessions benefit parties that 
are not willing to match this commitment level in return. The free-rider problem, in a plurilateral 
setting, can only be solved through variable geometry rules, which ensure that bargains between high-
commitment parties exclusively benefit this narrower set of countries, rather than the entire 
membership. 
Differentiation of commitments, in any case, is less practical with regard to substantive rules that 
codify general disciplines on complex border and behind-the-border policies, such as customs 
administration, standard setting and conformity assessment, competition policy, intellectual property 
rights, and investment regimes. In these areas, where the agreements can only provide for disciplines 
that apply to all parties equally, we expect the lowest common denominator of policy preferences (as a 
function of ASEAN members’ degree of heterogeneity / proximity) to determine the coverage and the 
depth of the agreements. 
In contrast, coverage and depth of PTAs, which advanced ASEAN member states negotiate 
individually with the very same developed non-ASEAN partners (Japan, Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand) in parallel to ASEAN+1 agreements, are likely to exceed the coverage and depth of 
ASEAN+1 accords. Governments of the more advanced ASEAN members - such as Singapore, 
Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand, and even Viet Nam, Indonesia, and the Philippines – may come to the 
conclusion that their domestic regulatory, institutional, and economic status quo allows them to 
individually commit to complex customs or behind-the-border-reforms and to advance their economic 
interest by establishing bilateral rules that tackle more complex trade and investment issues beyond 
traditional border barriers in a tailor-made fashion. Moreover, bilateral agreements with external 
partners can secure the exclusivity of concessions for the bargaining parties, hence increase the value 
of concessions for the benefiting party, and thereby lead to more valuable bargains and deeper 
commitments than in a plurilateral negotiation setting. 
We therefore expect that the PTAs that the more advanced ASEAN member states individually 
negotiate with developed ASEAN+1 external partners display more comprehensiveness in terms of 
issue area coverage, more depth in terms of concessions and hard legal disciplines, and more 
                                                     
24 Gilligan, Michael (2004): Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade Off in International Multilateral Agreements?, 
International Organization 58 (3) pp459-484 
Beyond Market Access? The Anatomy of ASEAN’s Preferential Trade Agreements 
11 
institutionalization than ASEAN+1 PTAs. Examples of such ‘parallel’ agreements are Japan’s separate 
PTAs with the seven more advanced ASEAN member states, Korea’s ongoing negotiations of 
individual agreements with Indonesia and Viet Nam in addition to the already sealed Korea-Singapore 
PTA, or Australia’s negotiations with Indonesia and Malaysia on top of its existing agreements with 
Singapore and Thailand. 
In the following subsection, we discuss the explanatory value of de facto economic interdependence 
between contracting parties for the depth and coverage of PTAs as means of de jure economic 
integration. 
2. The Relationship between de facto and de jure Economic Integration 
The conclusion of PTAs between two or more countries can be explained by means of two diverging 
rationales, which, in fact, place de facto and de jure economic integration at the opposite ends of their 
respective causality chains.  
According to the first hypothesis, countries conclude PTAs in a context of low levels of trade 
interdependence with a view to unleashing the trade potential between their economies. This typically 
starts with the dismantling of traditional market access barriers – tariffs and import quotas.  
The second and equally plausible hypothesis holds that high levels of trade interdependence render the 
conclusion of PTAs necessary as policy-makers seek to tackle increasingly complex (non-tariff) trade 
barriers, which only come to the forefront as a result of high levels of interdependence. In other words, 
de jure integration may be a consequence of either underdeveloped or advanced de facto economic 
integration.25 Either cause, however, results in very different types of institutional design in terms of 
issue area coverage and depth, as we will discuss below. 
The prevalent approach explaining the large amounts of PTAs that were concluded in East and 
Southeast Asia in the past 15 years and the mass of agreements that are currently under negotiation 
portrays this current wave of de jure regionalism as ‘market-driven’, i.e. as a consequence of high 
levels of existing trade interdependence within the region. 
This narrative of market driven Asian de jure regionalism starts with the exorbitant growth in Japanese 
wages in the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted in the loss of Japan’s comparative advantage in many 
manufacturing sectors. Looking for more cost-efficient locations for production, Japanese automobile 
and electric machinery producing multi-national companies (MNC) offshored labor intensive stages of 
manufacturing (including assembly) to nearby Asian economies, where they found abundance in low 
wage labor, while Japanese firms retained the production of high-technology parts and components in 
Japan.26 
What followed was a long period of market driven intra-regional trade and foreign direct investment in 
neighboring ASEAN economies and the Republic of Korea, which, through learning and innovation at 
the firm level, increasingly outward oriented national trade and development strategies that replaced 
prior import substitution policies, and enhanced investment in human capital and infrastructure, 
became more and more competitive in supplying MNCs or producing high-technology parts and 
components. Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong China, and Taiwan subsequently experienced rising labor 
costs themselves and offshored labor-intensive production to more cost efficient production locations 
within the ASEAN region.  
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These developments were manifested in the establishment of sophisticated intraregional production 
sharing networks and intra-industry trade in parts and components, which created what is now called 
the ‘Factory Asia’.27 The growth and development of Asian regional production networks was further 
facilitated by falling transport costs as well as innovations in information technology.28 China’s 
increasing openness, moreover, added another 500 million low-wage and low-productivity workforce 
to the Factory Asia, which further eroded the comparative advantage of ‘headquarter economies’ in 
labor intensive production and made offshoring solutions even more efficient.29 
Nominal trade figures appear to mirror the establishment of ASEAN as an integrated production 
network. Between the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 and the entry into force of the AFTA in 1992 
- a pure tariff reduction agreement - total merchandise trade among ASEAN’s five original members 
expanded from US$ 8.9 billion to US$ 357 billion. In the same period, total exports of parts and 
components rose from 2% to 17%, whereas intraregional trade in parts and components increased 
from 2% to 18%.30 
Proponents of the ‘market-driven’ explanatory approach to de jure integration among ASEAN 
countries and the wider East Asian region argue that efficient and sustainable intraregional production 
sharing networks required low trade costs as well as predictable economic policies. One element of 
intraregional trade costs had been addressed through falling tariff barriers as the result of AFTA and 
multilateral tariff liberalization within the GATT framework. However, as the 2011 World Trade 
Report notes, differences in legal systems and economic institutions among countries in areas such as 
customs administration, product and services standards, intellectual property rights protection, 
investment protection, competition policy regimes, as well as access to dispute settlement mechanisms 
increased transaction costs and uncertainties for traders and investors. Hence, “to keep the momentum 
of production networks going, countries increasingly needed to turn their attention to policies beyond 
tariff reduction.”31 Supporting empirical evidence of the effects of ASEAN’s deep and comprehensive 
de jure integration is drawn from studies which suggest that ASEAN’s ongoing efforts in the areas of 
customs reform and behind-the-border measures have resulted in a significant decrease of costs arising 
in the course of intra and interregional trade (stemming from non-discriminatory intra-ASEAN 
reforms in the latter case).32 
Many scholars, furthermore, generalize the ‘market-driven’ rationale for the entire East Asian region. 
Kawai and Wignaraja (2009), among others, consider “the spread of FTAs in East Asia” to be “first 
and foremost” the result of “deepening market driven economic integration through trade”, which 
required “further liberalization of trade and FDI as well as harmonization of policies, rules, and 
standards governing trade and FDI.”33 In summary, the by far most prevalent explanatory approach 
presents ASEAN’s and East Asia’s history of regional economic integration as an example par 
excellence for market-driven ‘deep and comprehensive’ integration agreements among highly 
interdependent trading partners.  
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This finding is surprising to the extent that contemporary East Asian PTAs encompass very different 
combinations of signatories, with highly diverse economic and institutional capacities, economic 
structures, trading relationships among each other, regulatory preferences etc. In this context, one 
would expect, in fact, that the institutional design of contemporary East Asian PTAs varies depending 
on such structural factors. We will come back to this point further below. 
Other factors that are commonly referred to in the above cited literature, with a view to explaining the 
sheer explosion of PTA numbers and negotiations in the region during the past 15 years - if, however, 
only subsidiary to the ‘market-driven integration’ rationale) - include the creation of a new sense of 
East Asian identity and collectivity following the 1997 Asian economic crisis; ‘competitive’ regional 
integration in response to deepening economic integration in North America (NAFTA) and Europe 
(EU Common Market); as well as, most recently, the breakdown of Doha Round world trade 
negotiations. 
Ravenhill (2010) is among the few to contest the ‘market-driven’ rationale for East Asian regionalism 
in its entirety.34 The main challenge that Ravenhill advances targets the very foundation of the 
‘market-driven’ de jure integration narrative, notably the contention that high levels of trade 
interdependence have resulted in deep and comprehensive PTAs in the region. 
To support his challenge, Ravenhill points at the allegedly negligible intraregional trade share increase 
in East Asia - narrowly defined as ASEAN member states plus China, Japan, and Korea - from 37.6% 
in 1995 to 38.3% in 2006. Secondly, he presents trade share data, which suggests that the share of 
China’s exports to the region has declined sharply from 53% in 1996 to 36% in 2007.  
Third, Ravenhill deems declining intraregional trade intensity35 in the entire Asian region in the period 
from 1955 to 1995, at which point the index stabilizes, as hard evidence contradicting the prevalent 
narrative of increasing Asian trade interdependence. 36 Intraregional trade intensity is a measure that 
adjusts for the economic size bias of raw trade share data and is therefore a much more reliable 
indicator for trade interdependence.  
What Ravenhill omits, however, is that ASEAN’s intraregional trade intensity index has, between 
1980 and 2009, always been far higher than in any other major trading region, such as the EU-15 or 
NAFTA. During the same period, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, Korea) intraregional trade intensity 
consistently ranged in between of EU-15 and NAFTA.37 Ravenhill also dispenses with a deeper 
analysis of the fluctuations of Asia’s and ASEAN’s intraregional trade intensity during the past thirty 
years and does not zoom in on the intensity of trade among individual trading partners (e.g. ASEAN-
Japan, ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Korea etc.). He merely states that ‘Asia’s’ intraregional trade intensity 
was higher in 1955 than in 1995 – an observation that is of little value for any argument. 
Furthermore, the author purports - on the basis of the limited amounts of available empirical 
evidence38 - that utilization rates of AFTA as well as of several ASEAN+1 PTA plurilateral 
agreements have been low, notably due to negligible preferential margins provided by these 
agreements. Ravenhill infers an indifference of businesses with regard to the allegedly negligible 
benefits of the agreements.39 As already stated in section II of this paper, 90% of preferences under 
                                                     
34 Ravenhill, John (2010): The ‘new East Asian regionalism’: A political domino effect, Review of International 
Political Economy, pp1-31 
35 The intraregional trade intensity index is the ratio of intra-regional trade share to the share of world trade with 
the region, calculated by using exports data. An index of more than one indicates that trade flow within the 
region is larger than expected given the importance of the region in world trade. 
36 Ravenhill (2010): op.cit. p5 
37 Hamanaka (2012): op. cit. p6 
38 ASEAN’s customs authorities are notorious for publishing little data on preference utilization. 
39 Ravenhill (2010): op. cit. p22   
David Kleimann 
14 
AFTA have progressively been multilateralized by ASEAN member states over the years. In this way, 
ASEAN’s plurilateral tariff liberalization program has significantly contributed to opening the region 
to global trade in a faster fashion than would have been achieved through GATT and WTO 
negotiations. The multilateralization of AFTA tariff reductions explains the fact that utilization rates of 
AFTA preferences have fallen dramatically over the years. In this context, however, the reported 
utilization of AFTA preferences for 30.9% (Thailand), 19.1% (Malaysia), and 14% (Philippines) of 
intraregional exports in 2005 indicate that businesses are in fact all but indifferent to the remaining 
10% non-multilateralized AFTA preferences and the remaining difference to ASEAN countries’ 
applied MFN tariff rates.  
It is noteworthy in this context that it is common practice among trading nations around the globe to 
shelter sensitive sectors through tariff peaks, which are hidden behind a very narrow range of tariff 
lines. 10% of tariff lines, beyond doubt, can provide for very significant policy space for the protection 
of the most sensitive domestic industries from non-ASEAN exports. Some commentators indicate that 
ASEAN countries have indeed used this space to accommodate some of their most vested domestic 
sectoral interests.40 
Ravenhill’s argument culminates in the allegation that the institutional design of PTAs in the region 
consistently omits the elements necessary to address ‘deep integration’ issues, such as rules on 
intellectual property rights, investment, competition policy, and government procurement, which is, in 
turn, presented as a logical consequence of shallow regional de facto economic integration.41 
Ravenhill concludes that, in absence of business interests, geostrategic and diplomatic considerations 
of political elites were the driving forces behind the recent wave of PTA negotiations in East Asia, 
with China causing a ‘political domino effect’ in the region by proposing negotiations with ASEAN in 
2001. Competing political interests as well as diverging visions of the region, rather than deepening 
trade integration, had encouraged other non-ASEAN countries to match China’s initiative swiftly in 
order to prevent their exclusion from a new era of East Asian economic diplomacy.42 If we follow 
Ravenhill’s logic, this political domino effect then resulted in the negotiation of about two dozens 
plurilateral and bilateral East Asian PTAs – on purely political grounds.  
But regional negotiation activity was, according to Ravenhill’s theory, not only not driven by business 
interests. He goes further by suggesting that – because “institutional design matters” – East Asian 
governments deliberately opted for shallow PTAs, with ASEAN+1 PTAs with China and India being 
the most notorious in terms of lack of WTO-plus and WTO-extra coverage as well as depth of 
commitments. Even ASEAN+1 accords with developed economies such as Korea and Japan had 
failed, despite their broader coverage, to create deep substantive commitments. We shall address this 
contention in section V below. At this point, it suffices to make two comments.  
First, Ravenhill’s PTA sample does not include any of the intraregional accords that ASEAN member 
states have concluded in parallel to ASEAN+1 agreements. In other words, his conclusions, which he 
applies to the entire region and all intraregional PTAs, are based on incomplete evidence. 
Secondly, Ravenhill seems to employ a somewhat static concept of preferential trade agreements. This 
concept, which over-emphasizes the importance of hard legal disciplines, precludes the consideration 
of both the point of departure of bilateral or plurilateral commercial and diplomatic relations as well as 
the fact that PTAs frequently serve as cooperation and negotiation platforms, i.e. as a starting point for 
the sequential and gradual development of broader and deeper commitments in the future. Exemplary 
agreements of this kind are, for instance, EU Association Agreements with Mediterranean countries, 
which have significantly expanded and deepened over time to address evolving trade issues. Such 
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arrangements, which can be characterized by a hard legal core surrounded by a larger realm of soft law 
in their early stages, are most plausible when the signatories include one or several developing 
countries, which would be overburdened with the implementation of a wide range of hard legal and 
specific substantive obligations that require complex border and behind the border reforms. What 
matters most for such agreements, initially, is the establishment of an effective bilateral or plurilateral 
institutional infrastructure and procedural rules, which can be employed for the design of joint action 
plans, capacity building programs and associated resource dedication, the prioritization of further rule 
development, and the informal settlement of disputes.43  
This type of PTA, to be sure, is not to be confused with agreements that are negotiated for a set of 
mature and advanced trading relationships between two or more developed trading partners with 
strong economic and institutional capacities. The latter type of commercial relationships indeed 
warrants the negotiation of comprehensive and deep hard legal commitments to address the more 
complex trade issues that mature trade relations bring to the fore. 
Returning to Ravenhill’s narrative of East Asian regionalism, governments allegedly sought to limit 
both positive and negative effects that these agreements could exert domestically by choosing a 
shallow design of ASEAN+1 PTAs, and thereby reduced the potential of domestic political 
consequences for the governing elite.44 We submit, at this point, that, if policy makers were in fact 
serious about avoiding economic impact or relevance for businesses, they appear to have done a lousy 
job. Looking at the telling example of the two largest countries in the region, we observe that the 
implementation of the ASEAN-China PTA has resulted in widespread and vigorous opposition from 
the Indonesian private sector and complementary mass demonstrations across the country in 2009, 
which aimed at a renegotiation of the agreement or a delay of the phase-in of tariff reductions. At the 
same time, in light of the fact that the Indonesian economy as a whole was expected to benefit from 
the agreement in a significant manner, domestic trade observers and experts advocated for retaining 
the implementation schedule as it was negotiated. However, the domestic pressures applied by no less 
than 14 industrial sector representatives and the general public led to major quarrels at the highest 
domestic political level and forced the Indonesian government to demand a longer implementation 
period for the agreement at an intergovernmental summit in Yogjakarta, though without success.45 In 
addition to this anecdotal, though insightful, evidence, several econometric studies have demonstrated 
the potential welfare benefits that ASEAN+1 PTAs can result in, as well as the economic costs that to 
those who are excluded from these agreements.46 
In summary, we have presented two sharply diverging explanatory approaches for the increase in 
negotiations and the conclusion of East Asian PTAs and their alleged institutional design. The first 
approach contends that high levels of de facto economic integration have rendered necessary and 
resulted in the negotiation and conclusion of multiple deep and comprehensive PTAs across the 
region, notwithstanding other subsidiary but nonetheless important factors. The second approach has 
launched a full-on attack on the prevalent ‘market-driven’ de jure integration narrative and, instead, 
explains contemporary Asian regionalism by reference to competing geopolitical and strategic 
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considerations of the governments involved, which resulted in narrow and shallow PTAs with little 
relevance for private sector actors. Both approaches display a high level of generalization, abstraction, 
as well as a strong reliance on one main source of causality, i.e. either market forces or geopolitical 
considerations of governing elites. 
In our view, both approaches suffer, despite a core of plausible reasoning, from both a rather selective 
presentation of empirical evidence as well as a monolithic orientation towards the explanation of a 
highly complex and multi-faceted phenomenon - notably ‘East Asian regionalism’. In context of a set 
of highly diverse nation states, in terms of their ‘proximity’ attributes as outlined above; distinct levels 
of economic interdependence between different pairs or groups of economies in the region; as well as 
countries’ different positions on the geopolitical chessboard, we find it hardly convincing that only 
one factor can sufficiently explain a wide range of in fact very different institutional phenomena.47 
Instead, we advocate for both a more nuanced and holistic approach, which considers a variety of 
explanatory variables and looks at each and every trading relationship, de jure and de facto, 
individually, rather than seeking to explain ‘East Asian regionalism’ as a whole by reference to a 
single factor in a dogmatic fashion. It appears to be rather implausible that larger numbers of policy 
makers, representing highly diverse nation states and economies with highly diverse economic 
relationships among each other, advance decisions on negotiation proposals as well as negotiation 
positions on the design of a prospective agreement solely on the basis of one determining factor – 
which is, on top of all, assumed to be invariant across different social, economic, and political 
contexts. 
To be sure, this is not to say that geopolitical considerations or market forces did not play a major role 
in the decision-making process of some governments to propose negotiations and negotiate specific 
PTA contents, just as much as it would be absurd to deny that East Asian regionalism has been 
partially inspired by North American and European economic integration, the experience of the 1997 
Southeast Asian crisis, and the breakdown of Doha negotiations. Similarly, it appears unreasonable to 
assume that the degree of proximity or heterogeneity among different sets of countries lacks a bearing 
on the design of PTAs, which, in turn, were negotiated irrespective of countries’ economic and 
institutional capacities.  
What is striking, however, is the fact that proponents of either approach consistently overemphasize 
the explanatory value of their respective theory and the empirical evidence they present, which then 
allows them to explain all PTAs negotiated within the region across the board. This notion particularly 
applies to their reference of trade interdependence as an either critical or negligible variable. A more 
nuanced observation, as presented below, reveals that the degree of trade interdependence between 
various configurations of East Asian economies at various points in time, and the respective 
institutional design of PTAs associated with these country configurations, in fact differ considerably.  
We now turn to an examination of trade interdependence between ASEAN and its member states, on 
the one hand, and its external PTA partners, on the other. Subsequently, in section V, we examine the 
institutional design of ASEAN+1 PTAs and then compare these agreements with six PTAs that 
ASEAN member states’ have concluded with Japan individually in parallel. In our analysis, we are 
guided by the question, whether high levels of trade interdependence in fact result in deeper and 
broader PTAs, and vice versa. 
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means of a ‘multi-motive’ approach, see: [forthcoming] Messerlin, Patrick A. (2013): The Domestic Political 
Economy of Preferential Trade Agreements, in Kleimann, David (ed): ‘Global Europe? Aspects of 
Contemporary EU Preferential Trade Agreements’, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS  2013/[xx], Florence, Italy. 
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3. The Intensity of ASEAN’s Trade with ASEAN+1 Partners 
In the past 15 years, ASEAN’s internal trade, compared to its trade with the rest of the world, has been 
considerably lower than the intraregional trade shares of NAFTA or the EU-15. This, however, is 
owed to the fact that ASEAN states are comparatively small trading nations. 
ASEAN’s intraregional trade shares increased from the 1980ies on (from 17% in 1986 to 24% in 
2009), which is when Japanese multinational companies started to outsource labor intensive 
production stages to ASEAN member states and established production networks in the region. Trade 
share values of ASEAN + Japan, if defined as a region, followed the very same trend, with the only 
difference that ASEAN + Japan intraregional trade shares exceeded the value of ASEAN intraregional 
trade shares at all times by between one and seven percentage points, indicating the central Japanese 
position within the highly integrated production networks that developed in the region.48  
ASEAN’s intraregional trade intensity49, at values of between 5.0 and 3.0, has always exceeded 
respective values of NAFTA (between 1.9 and 2.7) and the EU-15 (between 1.2 and 1.8) during the 
same period. ASEAN’s intensity scores, however, sharply declined at around 1985, from 5.0 to 3.0. 
The index only stabilized in 1995, which is when another upward trend commenced that left the region 
with a score of roughly 4.0 in 2008.50 
In context of decreasing trade intensity in ASEAN in the second half of the 1980ies, the conclusion of 
the 1992 tariff-only (i.e. ‘shallow’) AFTA is highly plausible, as tariff elimination is the first and 
easiest measure to be employed in order to stop a trend of declining intraregional trade, which was in 
fact successfully reverted by the year 1998. ASEAN’s successive behind-the-border economic 
integration initiatives can be explained by both increasing trade interdependence and the emergence of 
more complex ‘second generation’ trade barriers as tariffs were being dismantled and production 
networks were established across the region. 
Intraregional trade intensity of the region defined as ASEAN + China, however, has continuously 
declined over the past thirty years (from 3.1 in 1980 to 1.4 in 2009), starting at considerably lower 
values than ASEAN, but higher values than ASEAN + Japan. ASEAN + Japan intraregional trade 
intensity surpassed ASEAN + China scores in 1992 already. Decreasing trade interdependence 
between ASEAN and China can be explained by China’s emergence as a global rather than a regional 
trader, whereas increasing trade interdependence between ASEAN and Japan (from 1.5 in 1986 to 2.4 
in 2009) follows the production network rationale.51 Again, the attempt to revert the trend of 
decreasing regional trade interdependence can provide a convincing economic explanation for the 
conclusion of a ‘shallow’ ASEAN-China trade accord (entry into force in 2005) that focuses on the 
removal of traditional market access barriers rather than second generation trade barriers. If defined as 
a region, ASEAN + India intraregional intensity values are reported to reside at levels similar to those 
of ASEAN + China, with the only difference that a ‘shallow’ market access agreement between 
                                                     
48 Hamanaka (2012): op. cit. pp6-7 
49 Our sources computed intraregional trade intensity as: 
 
where Xii is exports of region i to region i; Xiw is exports of region i to the world, Xwi is exports of world to region 
i, and Xww is total world exports. It determines whether trade within the region is greater or smaller than 
should be expected on the basis of the region's importance in world trade. An index of more than one 
indicates that the trade flow within the region is larger than expected given the importance of the region in 
world trade.  
50 Hamanaka (2012): op. cit. pp6-7 
51 Hamanaka (2012): op. cit. pp6-7 
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ASEAN and India (as concluded in 2010) would aim at unleashing unearthed trade potentials rather 
than reverting a declining trend.52 
The case is very different for the trading relationship between ASEAN and Japan, which, if defined as 
a region, approximates (with a value of roughly 2.4 in 2009) the intraregional trade intensity values of 
NAFTA (2.7 in 2009), and exceeds the value of the EU-15 in the same year (roughly 1.8).53 Generally, 
trade interdependence at this level provides for a convincing rationale for de jure integration that aims 
at disciplining more sophisticated border and behind-the-border measures, in order to decrease 
transaction costs along the regional supply chain network. 
If we both broaden and refine our approach by looking at ‘trade intensity’54 data (which is computed 
on the basis of a different formula than ‘intraregional trade intensity’) for all combinations of 
ASEAN+1 external partners with ASEAN as a whole and with individual ASEAN member states, we 
can observe several interesting patterns. Tables 2 to 7 below present respective trade intensity scores 
for the period between 1990 and 2008.  
First, Japan consistently scores high trade intensity values with ASEAN in general, and for its trade 
relationships with the seven more advanced ASEAN member states in particular, with a slightly 
below-average score for its trade relationship with Singapore. Table 2 also displays very low scores 
for Japan’s relationship with the poorest countries in the region, notably Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar. 
Interestingly, Japan has negotiated and concluded parallel and separate PTAs with the seven ASEAN 
countries that it trades intensively with, all of which came into force between 2006 and 2009, with the 
exception of Japan’s FTA with Singapore (2002).   
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, generally, score very low on trade intensity with almost all non-
ASEAN external partners. There are a few exceptions (notably China-Myanmar, India-Myanmar, 
China-Laos, and China-Cambodia), which can be explained by the strong reliance of these miniscule 
economies on trade with the geographically proximate economic giants, China and India. The tiny oil 
sultanate Brunei Darussalam scores extraordinarily high on trade intensity with Australia, Japan, 
Korea, and New Zealand, which are all among Brunei’s top six export destinations in 2010 and among 
the top ten of Brunei’s overall trade partners. 
                                                     
52 ibid. p15 
53 ibid. p6-7 
54  The trade intensity index is calculated in a different manner than the intraregional trade intensity  index, 
which we have used in our discussion above. Our sources computed the index as: 
 
where tij is the dollar value of total trade of country/region i with country/region j, Tiw is the dollar value of the 
total trade of country/region i with the world, twj is the dollar value of world trade with country/region j, and 
Tww is the dollar value of world trade. An index of more than one indicates that trade flow between 
countries/regions is larger than expected given their importance in world trade.  
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Table 2: Japan – ASEAN Trade Intensity 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics / ADB Regional Integration Centre 
Note: Blue shades indicate the existing PTA with ASEAN; green shades indicate existing separate PTAs with individual 
ASEAN member states; red shades indicate ongoing PTA negotiations with an individual ASEAN member state; 
parenthesized dates indicate the year of the coming into force of the agreement. 
Table 3: Australia – ASEAN Trade Intensity 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics / ADB Regional Integration Centre 
Note: Blue shades indicate the existing PTA with ASEAN; green shades indicate existing separate PTAs with individual 
ASEAN member states; red shades indicate ongoing PTA negotiations with an individual ASEAN member state; 
parenthesized dates indicate the year of the coming into force of the agreement. 
Indicator 
 
Partner 
 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Trade Intensity 
Index Indonesia (2008) 5.24 4.21 3.77 3.30 3.63 3.11 3.08 3.16 
Trade Intensity 
Index Lao PDR 1.58 1.49 0.82 0.69 0.53 0.35 0.30 0.43 
Trade Intensity 
Index Cambodia 1.10 3.59 0.61 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.50 0.53 
Trade Intensity 
Index ASEAN (2008) 2.90 2.65 2.56 2.36 2.41 2.38 2.29 2.33 
Trade Intensity 
Index Brunei (2008) 4.43 4.20 3.41 4.33 5.03 5.67 5.95 7.32 
Trade Intensity 
Index Malaysia (2006) 2.42 2.45 2.21 2.04 2.12 1.94 1.82 2.02 
Trade Intensity 
Index Thailand (2007) 3.26 3.11 3.25 2.86 2.76 3.21 3.20 3.01 
Trade Intensity 
Index Viet Nam (2009) 4.04 2.79 2.15 2.40 2.45 2.26 2.26 2.54 
Trade Intensity 
Index Singapore (2002) 1.91 1.73 1.93 1.77 1.79 1.58 1.45 1.45 
Trade Intensity 
Index Myanmar 1.19 1.19 1.00 1.41 1.01 0.83 0.80 0.83 
Trade Intensity 
Index Philippines (2008) 2.69 2.81 2.83 2.84 2.81 2.99 2.76 2.61 
Indicator 
 
Partner 
 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Trade Intensity 
Index Indonesia 2.80 3.45 2.96 4.51 3.26 3.25 2.81 2.29 
Trade Intensity 
Index Lao PDR 0.48 3.51 1.97 0.22 0.42 0.66 1.32 0.31 
Trade Intensity 
Index Cambodia 0.96 0.63 0.77 0.34 0.21 0.27 0.54 0.34 
Trade Intensity 
Index ASEAN (2010) 2.05 2.30 1.89 2.15 2.25 2.30 2.59 2.76 
Trade Intensity 
Index 
Brunei 
Darussalam 0.98 1.56 1.01 0.70 3.48 6.61 7.02 6.91 
Trade Intensity 
Index Malaysia 1.81 1.69 1.58 1.86 1.88 1.89 2.21 2.39 
Trade Intensity 
Index Thailand (2005) 1.34 1.69 1.53 1.71 2.06 2.43 2.83 3.26 
Trade Intensity 
Index Viet Nam 0.98 2.96 2.10 3.25 5.42 3.92 4.40 3.70 
Trade Intensity 
Index Singapore (2003) 2.40 2.65 2.02 1.93 2.34 2.19 2.81 3.28 
Trade Intensity 
Index Myanmar 1.60 1.41 0.29 0.55 0.44 0.31 0.55 0.30 
Trade Intensity 
Index Philippines 1.71 1.70 1.66 1.26 1.20 1.15 0.97 1.07 
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Table 4: New Zealand – ASEAN Trade Intensity 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics / ADB Regional Integration Centre 
Note: Blue shades indicate the existing PTA with ASEAN; green shades indicate existing separate PTAs with individual 
ASEAN member states; red shades indicate ongoing PTA negotiations with an individual ASEAN member state; 
parenthesized dates indicate the year of the coming into force of the agreement. 
 
Australia’s story is one of a high and generally increasing trade intensity with ASEAN in general, 
from 1.89 in 1995 to 2.76 in 2008, which applies to six more advanced ASEAN members in particular. 
The Philippines are the exception, with a score far below the ASEAN average. By 2008, Australia had, 
in fact, a more intensive trade relationship with ASEAN member states than Japan.  
Australia has already concluded parallel and separate PTAs with Singapore (2003), and Thailand 
(2005) and is currently negotiating with Malaysia (signed in 2012, but not yet ratified) and Indonesia. 
All of these trading partners score high on trade intensity with Australia. Trade intensity scores for 
both Singapore and Thailand have greatly increased – though from high levels and following an 
upward trend - since the entry into force of their accords with Australia. 
New Zealand’s profile very much resembles the one of Australia, whereas, for New Zealand, Viet 
Nam takes the place of the odd below-average-intensity trading partner instead of the Philippines in 
case of Australia. On average, New Zealand now trades as intensively with ASEAN members as 
Japan. It has concluded parallel and separate PTAs with Singapore (2001), Thailand (2005), and 
Malaysia (2010). All of these partners made for three of New Zealand’s four most intensive trade 
relationships with ASEAN member states in 2008, whereas trade intensity with Singapore and 
Thailand has greatly increased since the coming into force of respective agreements. 
Korea, in contrast, is an ambivalent case, with an average ASEAN intensity score of 1.79 in 2008. 
Korea has intensive trading relationships with some of the more advanced and/or larger ASEAN 
members (Brunei, Indonesia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Singapore) and below average intensity levels 
with Malaysia and Thailand. Korea, in addition to its ASEAN+1 PTA, currently negotiates parallel 
and separate agreements with the two trading partners that it trades most intensively with, notably 
Indonesia and Vietnam, and has already concluded an accord with Singapore (2006). 
  
Indicator 
 
Partner 
 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Trade Intensity 
Index Indonesia 1.43 1.32 1.63 1.31 1.63 1.48 1.83 2.67 
Trade Intensity 
Index Lao PDR 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.90 0.18 0.06 0.09 
Trade Intensity 
Index Cambodia 1.05 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.17 
Trade Intensity 
Index ASEAN (2010) 1.15 1.26 1.08 1.26 1.26 1.40 1.61 2.34 
Trade Intensity 
Index 
Brunei 
Darussalam 0.06 0.38 0.71 0.35 0.14 8.29 4.41 12.91 
Trade Intensity 
Index Malaysia  (2010) 1.52 1.59 1.21 1.57 1.49 1.47 1.55 2.64 
Trade Intensity 
Index Thailand (2005) 0.90 1.09 0.88 1.27 1.29 1.49 1.75 2.19 
Trade Intensity 
Index Viet Nam 0.10 N/A 1.11 1.67 1.65 1.29 1.16 1.14 
Trade Intensity 
Index Singapore (2001) 0.94 1.17 0.84 1.01 0.96 1.03 1.52 2.21 
Trade Intensity 
Index Myanmar 0.19 0.01 0.08 0.48 0.66 0.37 0.16 0.30 
Trade Intensity 
Index Philippines 1.53 1.60 1.31 1.18 1.08 1.63 1.67 2.18 
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Table 5: Korea – ASEAN Trade Intensity 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics / ADB Regional Integration Centre 
Note: Blue shades indicate the existing PTA with ASEAN; green shades indicate existing separate PTAs with individual 
ASEAN member states; red shades indicate ongoing PTA negotiations with an individual ASEAN member state; 
parenthesized dates indicate the year of the coming into force of the agreement. 
Table 6: India – ASEAN Trade Intensity 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics / ADB Regional Integration Centre 
Note: Blue shades indicate the existing PTA with ASEAN; green shades indicate existing separate PTAs with individual 
ASEAN member states; red shades indicate ongoing PTA negotiations with an individual ASEAN member state; 
parenthesized dates indicate the year of the coming into force of the agreement. 
Indicator 
 
Partner 
 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Trade Intensity 
Index Indonesia 2.90 3.57 2.87 3.13 3.43 2.60 2.75 2.41 
Trade Intensity 
Index Lao PDR N/A N/A N/A 0.25 0.20 0.31 0.36 1.02 
Trade Intensity 
Index Cambodia N/A N/A N/A 1.39 1.10 0.90 0.82 0.95 
Trade Intensity 
Index ASEAN (2007) 1.71 2.07 1.67 1.98 1.86 1.76 1.67 1.79 
Trade Intensity 
Index Brunei Darussalam 3.23 3.16 2.70 4.20 3.85 3.59 4.29 4.97 
Trade Intensity 
Index Malaysia 1.87 1.73 1.29 1.94 1.62 1.51 1.44 1.43 
Trade Intensity 
Index Thailand 1.29 1.48 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.16 1.03 1.08 
Trade Intensity 
Index Viet Nam N/A 3.72 3.68 3.57 2.75 2.79 2.33 2.65 
Trade Intensity 
Index Singapore (2006) 1.33 1.92 1.67 1.55 1.58 1.55 1.48 1.85 
Trade Intensity 
Index Myanmar 1.25 1.10 1.15 2.44 2.58 1.53 0.98 1.06 
Trade Intensity 
Index Philippines 1.63 1.75 1.65 2.62 2.14 2.10 1.84 2.06 
Indicator 
 
Partner 
 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Trade Intensity 
Index Indonesia 0.98 0.69 1.65 2.03 1.83 2.50 2.04 2.03 
Trade Intensity 
Index Lao PDR 0.36 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.73 0.09 0.25 0.15 
Trade Intensity 
Index Cambodia 2.23 0.57 2.65 0.47 0.36 0.44 0.29 0.30 
Trade Intensity 
Index ASEAN (2010) 1.36 1.34 1.18 1.44 1.24 1.56 1.46 1.61 
Trade Intensity 
Index 
Brunei 
Darussalam 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.40 1.97 
Trade Intensity 
Index Malaysia (2011) 1.86 1.70 1.09 1.86 1.35 1.42 1.10 1.71 
Trade Intensity 
Index Thailand 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.89 0.98 0.84 0.91 
Trade Intensity 
Index Viet Nam 4.22 2.20 1.10 0.93 1.08 1.07 1.01 1.03 
Trade Intensity 
Index Singapore (2005) 1.67 1.74 1.37 1.54 1.40 1.90 2.20 2.20 
Trade Intensity 
Index Myanmar 9.55 12.09 8.63 9.94 6.73 9.43 7.71 6.12 
Trade Intensity 
Index Philippines 0.18 0.59 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.57 0.53 0.45 
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China and India, finally, score the by far lowest average trade intensity values with ASEAN member 
states, 1.55 and 1.61 with ASEAN respectively in 2008, with some individual exceptions (China-
Myanmar, China-Philippines, India-Indonesia, India-Brunei, India-Myanmar, India-Singapore). 
China’s trade intensity with ASEAN stagnated during the last 20 years, while India’s scores have 
slightly improved since 1995. China has concluded one separate and parallel PTA with Singapore. 
India has concluded two PTAs with above-average intensity partner countries (Singapore, 2005, and 
Malaysia, 2011) and currently negotiates one accord with a below-average intensity but large partner 
(Thailand). 
 
 
Table 7: China – ASEAN Trade Intensity 
Indicator 
 
Partner 
 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Trade Intensity 
Index Indonesia 1.65 1.64 1.51 1.64 2.04 1.36 1.34 1.33 
Trade Intensity 
Index Lao PDR 6.00 4.02 2.10 0.95 1.17 1.84 1.13 1.35 
Trade Intensity 
Index Cambodia 1.95 0.67 1.14 2.46 1.76 1.15 1.18 1.18 
Trade Intensity 
Index ASEAN (2005) 1.49 1.11 1.15 1.33 1.35 1.56 1.57 1.55 
Trade Intensity 
Index Brunei Darussalam 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.40 1.02 0.51 0.20 
Trade Intensity 
Index Malaysia 1.21 0.84 0.75 1.00 1.09 1.64 1.60 1.64 
Trade Intensity 
Index Thailand 1.36 0.86 1.01 1.21 1.36 1.46 1.43 1.49 
Trade Intensity 
Index Viet Nam 0.06 1.29 2.38 2.00 2.37 1.84 1.78 1.77 
Trade Intensity 
Index Singapore (2009) 1.72 1.20 1.24 1.52 1.28 1.51 1.49 1.33 
Trade Intensity 
Index Myanmar 13.94 11.04 8.43 6.25 3.60 3.38 2.57 2.60 
Trade Intensity 
Index Philippines 0.76 0.60 0.97 1.01 0.91 1.76 2.25 2.44 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics / ADB Regional Integration Centre 
Note: Blue shades indicate the existing PTA with ASEAN; green shades indicate existing separate PTAs with individual 
ASEAN member states; red shades indicate ongoing PTA negotiations with an individual ASEAN member state; 
parenthesized dates indicate the year of the coming into force of the agreement. 
 
4. Preliminary Conclusions 
The political and economic factors that influence policy-makers’ decisions to propose, negotiate, and 
conclude PTAs with regional partners are as numerous as the factors that determine the eventual 
coverage and depth of these agreements. In order to acquire a nuanced understanding of the legal 
content of ASEAN+1 accords, we ought to examine every respective trading relationship individually 
and then place them back into the context of the broader phenomenon of East Asian regionalism. As 
far as the scope of this paper allows us to do so, we have discussed the potential factors above and 
have come to the following preliminary conclusions. 
The conclusion of AFTA in 1992, as one of the first PTAs in East Asia, has been partially driven by 
external factors such as economic integration initiatives in North America and the European Union, as 
well as the rise of China as a trade power and destination of large amounts of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). As such, AFTA can be understood as a ‘competitive’ response sparked by external global 
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developments. At the same time, AFTA provided for a targeted countermeasure to the sharp decline – 
starting in 1985 - of ASEAN’s traditionally very high intraregional trade intensity – a trend that was 
only reverted by 1998. 
By that time, the spread of Japan-centred production networks throughout the region, the associated 
inflow of FDI, the rising importance of services to support regional supply chains, and the search for 
ways and means to lower intraregional transaction costs with a view to increasing the efficiency of 
fragmentation trade led to several economic integration initiatives, which, during the following 15 
years, resulted in legal accords on services, investment, standards, customs etc. ASEAN’s 
commitment to regional economic integration was significantly boosted by the 1997/98 financial 
crisis, which underlined the need for enhanced regional cooperation and integration. The increasing 
breadth and depth of the ASEAN acquis correlates with increasing intraregional trade intensity. 
Despite these achievements and its further ambitions for the establishment of the ASEAN Economic 
Community by 2016, ASEAN remains a loose confederation of extremely diverse nation states with 
very distinct economic and institutional capacities. ASEAN’s few regional institutions remain weak 
and leave policy initiatives, governance, and policy implementation to the member states. Because of 
ASEAN’s consensual modus operandi, the ASEAN acquis of today naturally only reflects the lowest 
common denominator of highly diverse policy preferences held by its heterogeneous members that 
move at the pace of the slowest. 
ASEAN’s heterogeneous membership and associated internal integration dynamics have important 
ramifications for the coverage and depth of plurilateral PTAs that ASEAN member states collectively 
conclude with external partners. Similar to ASEAN’s internal integration process, it is the ‘lowest 
common denominator’, as a function of the preparedness of the least developed signatories of the 
agreements, which determines the scope and depth of joint commitments. ASEAN+1 PTAs will 
therefore, both in terms of coverage and depth, not include commonly assumed hard legal obligations 
applying to policy areas for which such rules do not exist at the regional level. In other words, 
ASEAN+1 PTAs likely mirror, at most, the ASEAN acquis. In policy areas where the differentiation 
of commitments is technically possible, i.e. for tariff reductions as well as services and investment 
liberalization, ASEAN member states’ commitments are unlikely to exceed ASEAN internal 
commitments due to the free-rider problem that persists in a plurilateral negotiation setting. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the upper limit of commitments in ASEAN+1 PTAs is set by the 
ASEAN acquis, we expect the level of commitments of ASEAN+1 PTAs to correlate with the 
intensity of ASEAN trade with the external partner. This implies that the accords with Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand, and even Korea would include the most comprehensive and deepest disciplines, 
whereas PTAs with China and India would only provide for shallow market access disciplines. 
Separate and parallel PTAs of individual ASEAN member states with external high-intensity trading 
partners, moreover, are expected to exceed the ASEAN internal status quo as the limiting ‘lowest 
common denominator’ and ‘free-rider’ factors are absent in the bilateral negotiation setting. 
With these hypotheses in mind, we can construct the following narrative of ASEAN+1 regionalism. 
China, in 2001, has taken the first initiative to negotiate a PTA with ASEAN members collectively, 
which was motivated, as argued by many, by China’s strategic concerns over the exclusion from an 
economic and political integration process of a larger number of emerging powers in its immediate 
neighborhood as well as US and Japanese ambitions in the region.55 From a trade perspective, the 
2005 ASEAN-China PTA responded to a trend of declining intensity of intraregional ASEAN-China 
trade at already low levels. In context of low and declining trade intensity, a shallow PTA focused on 
traditional market access barrier removal provides for an effective immediate countermeasure. 
                                                     
55 See, for instance: Gao, Henry (2011): China’s strategy for free trade agreeements: political battle in the name 
of trade, in: Buckley, Ross P. & Weixing Hu, Richard & Arner, Douglas W. (eds.): ‘East Asian Economic 
Integration – Law, Trade, and Finance’, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northhampton, USA. 
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Notwithstanding the institutional capacity constraints that several smaller ASEAN members face in 
any case, China has traditionally avoided the negotiation of deep and comprehensive trade accords 
and, in line with this tradition, did not attempt to negotiate deeper and more comprehensive 
agreements with individual ASEAN members. Singapore remains the odd exception, as for all of 
ASEAN’s external partners, which is owed to Singapore’s bold strategy to pursue PTAs in the region 
and beyond since the late 1990ies. It is noteworthy, in this context, that trade agreements with 
Singapore come at very low cost for its negotiation partners, given the country’s virtually complete 
openness to imports and its strategic position as a transit harbor in the region. 
The conclusion of the ASEAN-China PTA set in train a ‘competitive liberalization’ process in the 
region, which involved all larger non-ASEAN economic powers. Japan in particular, in context of its 
anxiety over its geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia, was prompted to match the Chinese initiative. 
For that matter, Japan was forced to abandon its strategic orientation favoring trade liberalization 
through WTO-centred multilateral negotiations, albeit the growing recognition of the fact that the 
Doha Round was not going to deliver any outcomes in the foreseeable future and, if at all, not to the 
desired extent.56 The mature and intensive nature of ASEAN-Japan trade relations, in contrast to the 
ASEAN-China configuration, demanded deep and comprehensive integration measures. The 2008 
ASEAN-Japan accord therefore likely pushed the upper limits of, and somewhat resembles, the 
coverage and depth of the ASEAN acquis. Japan’s parallel and separate PTAs with the more advanced 
ASEAN member states, six of which were concluded between 2006 and 2009, hence likely responded 
to the demand for broader coverage and deeper integration, which ASEAN member states, 
collectively, could not deliver. 
The negotiation and conclusion of the ASEAN-Korea PTA (entry into force in 2007), followed, above 
all, the objectives of Korea’s 2003 ‘FTA Roadmap’, in which national leaders declared the intention to 
maintain and enhance Korea’s competitiveness abroad by concluding ‘high quality’ deep and 
comprehensive PTAs with its major trading partners. Since then, Korea has pursued a highly proactive 
negotiation strategy, which was further encouraged by the snail-pace progress in multilateral trade 
negotiations. Between 2005 and 2010, Korea concluded PTAs with ASEAN, the EU, and the US, 
among others, and is now in the process of negotiating similar accords with China, Japan, India, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.57 At the regional level, competitive liberalization dynamics, in all 
likelihood, played a major role in terms of timing of negotiations and choice of partners, as for all 
countries in the region. However, Korea’s trade intensity profile with ASEAN, as discussed above, is 
rather inconclusive. Korea does not display a strong regional bias towards trade with ASEAN member 
states across the board. However, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia make for important trading 
partners in the region, all of which are now negotiating separate and parallel agreements with Korea. 
ASEAN economies in aggregation, moreover, are now Korea’s second largest trading partner in terms 
of absolute trade value. 
ASEAN’s joint agreement with Australia and New Zealand, which came into force in 2010, as well as 
respective parallel agreements, are an example par excellence for market-driven de jure integration. 
Both Australia and New Zealand have reached high intensity trade levels with ASEAN member states 
during the past decade (with the exceptions of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar), which indicate 
maturing and now more sophisticated trade relationships between the booming ASEAN markets and 
the developed economies in the Pacific region. Both New Zealand and Australia have concluded, or 
are in the process of negotiating, separate PTAs with high-intensity trading partners within the 
ASEAN group - a fact that hints at the desire for deeper and more comprehensive integration through 
                                                     
56 See, for instance: Nakagawa, Junji (2011): Japan’s FTA (EPA) strategy in the light of competitive dynamics, 
in: Buckley, Ross P. & Weixing Hu, Richard & Arner, Douglas W. (eds.): ‘East Asian Economic Integration 
– Law, Trade, and Finance’, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northhampton, USA. pp86-87 
57 Junkyu, Lee (2012): Korea’s Trade Structure and its Policy Challenges, in: ‘The Future of Korean Trade 
Policy’, Korea Economic Institute, Washington DC. 
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individual agreements that go beyond the lowest common denominator of ASEAN members. As noted 
above, the negotiation and conclusion of these accords took and takes place in a context of a political 
and economic chain reaction in the region, which further accelerated in light of the failure of WTO 
negotiations to come to any result whatsoever. 
Finally, India put its foot into the door of the Southeast Asian growth markets in 2010 when its 
agreement with ASEAN came into force. As much as China, India pursues a very cautious trade policy 
strategy as regards the depth and coverage of its PTAs. In this context, a shallow ASEAN-India PTA 
would come at no surprise, which is even more so in light of the low trade intensity between the 
respective partners. ASEAN-India trade intensity data suggests that, as in the case of China, a PTA 
confined to market access, as a first step, would serve to boost merchandise trade until second-
generation trade barriers are revealed behind falling tariff protection. 
A final point, before we turn to the comparative examination of the content of ASEAN+1 PTAs: so 
far, we have only considered explanatory approaches for the legal content and depth of ASEAN PTAs. 
However, as briefly discussed above, the design of contemporary PTAs is often not confined to static 
legal obligations and commitments - whatever their legal strength may be – but frequently provides for 
future cooperation in policy areas, where all or some of the signatories to an agreement are often not 
prepared to take on hard legal obligations at that particular point in time. This may have various 
reasons, such as uncertainties associated with the economic or broader social impact of alternative 
policy options, or prevalent domestic institutional capacity constraints. Another reason for the 
proliferation of cooperation provisions in PTAs is the fact that some policy areas simply do not lend 
themselves to the ex ante prescription of detailed rules and provisions governing a particular policy 
area. For all of these reasons, PTAs frequently contain ‘living agreement’ instruments, i.e. a mandate 
for the establishment of bilateral or plurilateral institutional mechanisms, which serve as a negotiation 
and cooperation platform for the joint drafting of action plans, gradual rule development, the proposal 
of new policy initiatives, monitoring of implementation, etc.  
As we have discussed at great length above, we do not expect ASEAN+1 PTAs to go beyond the 
lowest common denominator of ASEAN member states policy preferences, which is mirrored in the 
ASEAN acquis. Where ASEAN external partners, however, have a strong preference for a coverage 
and depth, that would exceed this status quo, we expect that this preference will materialize in the 
agreements through the codification of cooperation provisions that are linked to the establishment of 
strong institutional mechanisms, i.e. ‘living agreement’ instruments, that can allow for the 
development of economic integration disciplines in the future. Cooperation provisions, on the other 
hand, which lack this institutional backbone, can be considered as of little if any value. As such, the 
presence of cooperation provisions, combined with the institutional dimension of a PTA - in addition 
to the hard legal coverage and depth of commitments - is a third analytical category, which should 
feature in any assessment of preferential trade agreements. 
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V. The Substantive Coverage and Depth of ASEAN’s PTAs 
One important dimension of the analysis of preferential trade agreements, as a first step, is the 
horizontal screening of their substantive coverage, i.e. the analysis of the ‘extensive’ dimension of the 
agreements.  
Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (HMS) have developed the most refined methodology so far. In their recent 
study, HMS have mapped the sectoral coverage of 28 US and EU PTAs.58 The authors identify 52 
policy areas, which they then classify into two groups. The first category of policy areas, labeled 
WTO-plus (WTO+) provisions, fall under the current mandate of the WTO and are already subject to 
some form of commitment in WTO agreements. WTO+ provisions reconfirm existing commitments 
and may provide for additional obligations in areas such as non-agricultural market access, agricultural 
tariffs, customs, TBT and SPS measures, anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing (CVM) measures, 
safeguards, services, public procurement, TRIPs, or TRIMS. The second category of policy areas, 
which HMS denote as WTO-extra (WTO-X) provisions, refers to obligations that are outside the 
current mandate of the WTO but frequently covered by contemporary preferential trade agreements, 
such as competition policy, IPR, investment protection and liberalization, movement of capital, 
environmental laws, labor market regulation etc.  
In a second step, HMS identify whether the covered provisions are ‘legally enforceable’ or not. In 
defining ‘legal enforceability’, HMS were guided by three main factors, notably, first, the codification 
of hard vs. soft legal language (e.g. the use of the term ‘shall’ instead of ‘should’); secondly, the 
specificity and detail vs. the vagueness of substantive obligations; and, third, the question of whether 
obligations are subject to a dispute settlement mechanism established under the respective agreements, 
or not. 
HMS’ systematic mapping of US and EU agreements is an excellent starting point for the comparison 
of the plethora of PTAs that have recently been concluded. Most prominently, the WTO Secretariat 
has used the HMS methodology in the preparation of the 2011 World Trade Report. WTO researchers 
expanded HMS’ analysis to a total of 96 PTAs. The sample includes all five ASEAN+1 agreements 
and six out of seven PTAs that Japan has concluded with more advanced ASEAN economies 
individually, which we, in the following, use as one benchmark for comparison.59 
To be sure, a horizontal analysis at this level cannot result in conclusions about the actual depth of 
legal integration that ASEAN+1 PTAs create through their disciplines in any policy area. For instance, 
in the field of WTO+ areas, covered provisions on TBT, SPS, or IPR may merely reaffirm the WTO 
disciplines that the partner countries are subject to in any case but can still attain the status of ‘legally 
enforceable’ in context of the criteria that HMS apply. Other agreements may contain hard legal 
substantive disciplines on harmonization of standards, mutual recognition of conformity assessment, 
or TRIPS+ rules. HMS’s methodology, however, does not differentiate between the former and the 
latter.  
It is necessary, for this reason, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the ‘intensive’ dimension of 
ASEAN+1 PTA disciplines and to assess them in light of useful benchmarks. What we consider 
‘useful’ is a comparison that can tell us where ASEAN+1 agreements create ‘new’ rules that go 
beyond the WTO legal status quo and the status quo of ASEAN internal integration. Moreover, we 
find a comparison valuable that allows us to understand the differences between the depth of 
ASEAN+1 de jure integration and the disciplines contained in individual ASEAN member states’ 
PTAs with the very same external partners. 
                                                     
58 Horn, Mavroidis, Sapir (2009): op. cit. 
59 WTO (2011): op. cit. pp 157-159 
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Nevertheless, the HMS mapping can provide for interesting insights as regards the general coverage of 
the agreements under review. We present respective data in the subsequent subsection. In addition to 
ASEAN+1 PTAs, we use six individual ASEAN member states’ PTAs with Japan as a comparator 
group. This comparison can, for this limited sample and at this general level, either verify or falsify 
our hypothesis that external partners sought to negotiate separate PTAs with more advanced ASEAN 
economies when ASEAN’s ‘lowest common denominator’ principle resulted in unsatisfactory 
coverage of ASEAN+1 PTAs. 
1. The Substantive Coverage of ASEAN’s PTAs 
Table 8 gives a general overview of the coverage of ASEAN+1 PTAs; the six ASEAN member states’ 
separate PTAs with Japan; as well as global averages drawn from the WTO Secretariat’s database of 
96 PTAs. Tables 9 and 10 provide for a breakdown of the coverage of ASEAN+1 PTAs and the six 
Japanese PTAs by policy area, whereas we only include policy areas that are legally enforceable (see 
explanatory note). In table 9, we include only those policy areas, which are covered in a legally 
enforceable manner by at least one of the PTAs under review and are not explicitly exempted from the 
PTAs dispute settlement mechanism at the same time (see explanatory note). 
Globally, the number of WTO+ areas covered by PTAs in the period of 1958 to 1999 averaged at 
seven WTO+ areas per PTA. Six out of seven policy areas were found to be legally enforceable.60 
Between 2000 and 2010, the average number of WTO+ areas in the PTAs included in the WTO 
sample increased from seven to ten areas, which were almost always legally enforceable. 
In the field of WTO-X provisions, the number of WTO-X areas covered by PTAs in the period of 
1958 to 1999 averaged at six WTO-X areas covered, whereas three of these policy areas were found to 
be legally enforceable. From 2000 to 2010, the average number of WTO-X areas increased from seven 
to nearly ten policy areas, whereas only four of these areas found to be legally enforceable. 
ASEAN+1 PTAs with developed economies - Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand - follow the 
recent trend towards an enhanced coverage of WTO+ and WTO-X disciplines. The same applies to all 
six PTAs that individual ASEAN members have concluded with Japan. Moreover, all of the before-
mentioned PTAs either match or exceed the global average number of enforceable disciplines. At a 
very general level, this observation allows for the conclusion that ASEAN members and their partner 
countries use the respective PTAs to advance policy objectives beyond the WTO status quo. 
ASEAN+1 PTAs with developing economies – China and India – give a very different impression. In 
terms of its substantive coverage, the ASEAN-China PTA is a particularly ‘thin’ agreement with only 
six WTO+ areas covered, of which four are enforceable. These are industrial and agricultural tariffs, 
AD and CVM measures, as well as services trade and provisions relating to the WTO TRIMS 
agreement. In the category of WTO-X areas, the agreement covers only investment. Similarly, the 
ASEAN-India PTA appears to be, on the first sight, a shallow market access agreement with an 
average coverage of WTO+ areas and zero coverage of WTO-X provisions. Both PTAs therefore 
remain far below the global average for WTO-X coverage in PTAs concluded among developing 
countries. 
  
                                                     
60 ibid.: p131 
David Kleimann 
28 
Table 8: WTO-plus and WTO-extra Policy Area Coverage in ASEAN’s PTAs 
 
Source: WTO World Trade Report 2011 
 
  
PTA WTO-plus areas covered 
WTO-plus 
areas legally 
enforceable 
WTO-
extra 
areas 
covered 
WTO-extra 
areas legally 
enforceable 
ASEAN - China 6 4 1 0 
     
ASEAN - India 9 8 0 0 
     
ASEAN - Korea 12 11 11 8 
     
ASEAN - Australia/ 
New Zealand 
11 11 8 5 
     
ASEAN - Japan 9 9 10 10 
     
Japan – Indonesia 9 9 8 4 
     
Japan – Malaysia 10 10 6 5 
     
Japan – Philippines 11 9 8 5 
     
Japan – Singapore 12 12 9 4 
     
Japan – Thailand 9 9 9 4 
     
Japan – Vietnam 12 12 5 4 
     
Global Average (2000-
10) 
10 10 10 4 
     
Global Average: 
developing country 
PTAs (2000-10) 
8 7 5 3 
     
Global Average: 
developing-developed 
country PTAs (2000-
10) 
 
11 
 
10 
 
10 
 
4 
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Table 9: WTO-plus Policy Area Coverage in ASEAN’s PTAs 
 
 
Source: WTO World Trade Report 2011 
Note: -2- denotes a policy area that is covered by an agreement, legally enforceable in terms of     legal language employed 
and specificity of the provisions, and not explicitly exempted from the dispute settlement mechanism of the PTA. -1- denotes 
a policy area that is covered, legally enforceable, but exempted from the dispute settlement mechanism of the PTA. -0- 
denotes a policy area that is either not covered at all, or not in a legally enforceable manner. 
 
The comparison of ASEAN’s PTA with Japan with Japan’s separate agreements with individual 
ASEAN member states allows for several interesting observations. In the WTO+ category, we find 
five policy areas in which the ASEAN-Japan PTA does not provide for any disciplines whatsoever, 
and where some or all of Japan’s separate agreements with ASEAN member states include substantive 
and enforceable rules that are not expressly excluded from the agreement’s dispute settlement 
provisions. These policy areas are export taxes (covered by the Japan-Singapore PTA), state trading 
enterprises (PTAs with Singapore, the Philippines, and Viet Nam), state aid (PTA with Viet Nam), 
public procurement (PTAs with Indonesia and Thailand), and provisions related to the WTO TRIPs 
agreement (PTAs with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam). 
A similar observation can be made with respect to the category of WTO-X disciplines. In the field of 
competition policy, the ASEAN-Japan PTA does in fact contain some provisions, which are, however, 
expressly excluded from dispute settlement. The Japan-Indonesia PTA, in contrast, contains 
competition policy provisions that are not excluded from recourse to dispute settlement.  
Moreover, the ASEAN-Japan agreement does include some kind of provisions on IPR that are, 
however, not subject to dispute settlement. In contrast, PTAs with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam contain IPR provisions that are not exempted from dispute settlement. Movement of 
capital is not covered in the ASEAN-Japan PTA at all, whereas all six separate PTAs under review 
cover fully enforceable rules.  
Finally, the ASEAN-Japan PTA does not contain any rules on visa and asylum, whereas all separate 
PTAs with ASEAN member states (except the agreement with Singapore) do contain such disciplines, 
which are subject to the agreements’ standard dispute settlement provisions.  
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ASEAN-India 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 
ASEAN-Korea 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 
ASEAN-China 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
ASEAN-Japan 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 
Japan-Indonesia 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 
Japan-Malaysia 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 
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Japan-Thailand 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 
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Table 10: WTO-extra Policy Area Coverage in ASEAN’s PTAs 
 
 
Source: WTO World Trade Report 2011, amended by the author 
Note: -2- denotes a policy area that is covered by an agreement, legally enforceable in terms of     legal language employed 
and specificity of the provisions, and not explicitly exempted from the dispute settlement mechanism of the PTA. -1- denotes 
a policy area that is covered, legally enforceable, but exempted from the dispute settlement mechanism of the PTA. -0- 
denotes a policy area that is either not covered at all, or not in a legally enforceable manner. 
 
These observations, however, hardly allow for conclusions about as to whether ASEAN+1 agreements 
remain within the realm of the ASEAN acquis or whether these agreements exceed ASEAN’s internal 
level of de jure integration. In fact, we do find that ASEAN agreements with a developed partner 
country cover a wide range of policy areas in both the categories of WTO+ and WTO-X disciplines. 
However, as we have discussed above, the coverage of a policy area does not indicate whether the 
agreement merely calls for future intergovernmental cooperation in the respective field – whatever the 
legal strength of the provision – or whether the provisions in fact demand implementation and 
enforcement action by signatories’ governments at the domestic level. Likewise, the horizontal level 
of analysis cannot tell us whether PTA rules require the establishment of regional institutions and the 
drafting, adoption, implementation and enforcement of rules and regulations at the regional level.  
For this reason, we analyze the ‘depth of integration’ of ASEAN+1 agreements in select policy areas 
in a comparative manner further below. Before we turn to this analysis, we briefly examine the 
proliferation of cooperation provisions in ASEAN+1 PTAs in the next sub-section. 
2. The Proliferation of Cooperation Provisions in ASEAN’s PTAs 
Another general observation relates to the proliferation of economic cooperation provisions across 
ASEAN+1 PTAs. Almost all of the agreements employ a general cooperation clause, which lists areas 
of cooperation across the board. The ASEAN – Australia / New Zealand PTA, in contrast, mandates 
further cooperation in the specific chapters that deal with the respective issue area. These mandates are 
subject to the agreements’ general chapter on economic cooperation, which lays down the details of 
the modalities of economic cooperation as well as respective institutional responsibilities. 
             Agreement 
C
om
pe
tit
io
n 
Po
lic
y 
IP
R
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
M
ov
em
en
t o
f 
C
ap
ita
l 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 
C
ul
tu
ra
l 
C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
En
er
gy
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
So
ci
et
y 
M
in
in
g 
R
eg
io
na
l 
C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
SM
E
 
V
isa
 a
nd
 
A
sy
lu
m
 
ASEAN-India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
ASEAN-Korea 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 
ASEAN-China 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ASEAN-Japan 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
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Japan-Singapore 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan-Thailand 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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The 2002 ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (under 
the umbrella of which the 2005 ASEAN-China PTA was concluded) identifies various areas of 
economic cooperation, including standards and conformity assessment, customs cooperation, 
investment, agriculture, capacity building and others. Similarly, the 2008 ASEAN-Japan 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement provides for numerous areas of cooperation, 
including trade facilitation, conformity assessment, mutual recognition of standards, business 
environment enhancement, energy, information and communications technology, human resource 
development, tourism and hospitality, as well as transportation and logistics. The 2010 ASEAN-Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement goes even further by identifying no less than 19 
cooperation areas, such as customs procedures, trade and investment promotion, standards and 
conformity assessment, as well as sanitary and phytosanitary measures. A similar horizontal 
cooperation clause is included in the ASEAN-India Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation, under the umbrella of which ASEAN and India negotiated the 2010 ASEAN-
India Trade in Goods Agreement. As mentioned above, the ASEAN-Australia/New Zealand PTA 
proceeds in a different manner, by exclusively specifying areas of cooperation in the various chapters 
of the agreement. 
The strong emphasis on economic cooperation in the agreements with regard to several important 
areas of integration indicates that ASEAN+1 agreements, with respect to such policy areas, may only 
mark the first step in a process towards future convergence and may well only establish a negotiation 
and cooperation platform, rather than to create specific and hard legal disciplines immediately.  
As we have discussed in the preliminary conclusions of section IV, the merits of these cooperation 
provisions are highly contingent upon the detail and strength of the respective mandates, i.e. their 
enforceability and the institutional dimension of the agreements, as the substantive objectives that are 
codified in ‘living agreement’ disciplines require an institutional platform and a strong political 
mandate in order to result in any tangible achievements in the future.  
We find that ASEAN’s PTAs with Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and Korea codify the modalities 
of economic cooperation in significant detail and hard legal language, make provisions for the 
allocation of necessary resources, the establishment of joint committees, and the identification of focal 
points within the administrative structure of each party, which are, in turn, mandated to draft economic 
cooperation work programs, monitor the implementation thereof, and report on implementation 
progress. ASEAN’s PTAs with China and India, in contrast, omit respective provisions altogether, 
which is why respective mandates for economic cooperation remain unenforceable and are not 
included in Tables 9 and 10. 
The proliferation of cooperation provisions in ASEAN+1 PTAs provides for indicative evidence of the 
importance of the ‘lowest common denominator’ principle for the depth of ASEAN+1 agreements. We 
may find in the following subsections that the agreements are characterized by a hard legal core of 
specific and enforceable obligations in key policy areas, which is surrounded by a realm of living 
agreement instruments in areas where some or all of the signatories were not (yet) prepared to make 
binding substantive commitments. 
This dual approach of providing for hard and specific legal disciplines in key policy areas, on the one 
hand, and economic cooperation towards further convergence in the future, on the other, would be 
particularly plausible in the ASEAN context, where highly diverse institutional and private sector 
capacities to implement, administer, enforce, and comply with complex new regulatory and border 
regimes persist.61 
                                                     
61 For a general overview of implementation challenges in developing countries, see: (forthcoming) Chauffour, 
Jean-Pierre & Kleimann, David (2013): op. cit. 
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3. The Depth of WTO-plus Commitments in ASEAN’s PTAs 
In this subsection, we broadly analyze the depth of commitments and the institutional dimensions of 
ASEAN+1 PTAs in the category of WTO-plus policy areas. In doing so, we compare the depth of 
these accords with the WTO status quo, the ASEAN acquis, and six of seven PTAs that individual 
ASEAN member states have concluded with Japan in parallel to the ASEAN-Japan PTA. These are 
Japan’s agreements with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. In 
this analysis, we focus on a number of WTO-plus policy areas, notably market access issues (tariff 
reductions for industrial and agricultural goods, customs, SPS and TBT measures, countervailing and 
anti-dumping measures, bilateral and global safeguards, and export taxes) as well as services, 
government procurement, and intellectual property rights. For this comparison, we have used the 
Comparative FTA Toolkit of the Asian Development Bank’s Regional Integration Centre.62  
A meaningful review of the rules of origin of the agreements under scrutiny would exceed the scope of 
this paper. A comprehensive analysis and assessment of AFTA/ATIGA and ASEAN+1 PTAs’ rules of 
origin has, however, been conducted by Medalla (2010).63 
Unsurprisingly, all five ASEAN+1 PTAs cover WTO+ liberalization in the areas of non-agricultural 
and agricultural market access and establish free trade areas in goods trade under Article XXIV of 
the GATT. ASEAN member states’ market access commitments in the area of merchandise trade 
stand in context of the liberalization that they have conducted under AFTA/ATIGA, within the WTO 
framework (including the plurilateral Information Technology Agreement - ITA), or by means of 
unilateral tariff reductions. 
ASEAN member states have not created a customs union, which is why they can and do retain 
individual tariff reduction schedules in all five ASEAN+1 PTAs. These schedules create the substance 
of their market access obligations. Disciplining tariffs through individual schedules allows for the 
differentiation of commitments among the signatories of the plurilateral PTAs. All ASEAN+1 
agreements, for instance, accord for special and differential treatment of the new ASEAN members, 
which takes the shape of longer transition periods for the implementation of tariff commitments vis-à-
vis the external partner and vis-à-vis the other ASEAN members. 
As an illustration, the ASEAN-Korea PTA follows a two-track liberalization schedule, which 
differentiates between ASEAN-6 countries CLMV. Under the normal track, tariffs must be eliminated 
by 2010 for ASEAN-6 and Korea. The four newly acceded ASEAN members have eight more years to 
follow a similar tariff reduction scheme (whereas Viet Nam is given 6 more years). Under the 
sensitive track, tariff reduction starts in 2012, to reach 0– 5% tariff levels by 2016 for ASEAN-6 and 
the Republic of Korea, by 2021 for Viet Nam, and by 2024 for the remaining ASEAN-3.64 
The plurilateral character of ASEAN+1 PTAs implies that ASEAN member states’ liberalization 
commitments do not only benefit the external partner but apply to all signatories inter se. This fact has 
no consequences for ASEAN-6 members commitments vis-à-vis other ASEAN members, as they have 
already achieved tariff elimination on more than 99% of tariff lines. Tariff concessions made by 
CLMV in context of ASEAN+1 PTAs, however, could, in theory, effectively change the status quo of 
AFTA/ATIGA, if such concessions exceeded their liberalization achievement under AFTA/ATIGA on 
the date of the entry into force of the respective external accord. We can, however, rule this theoretical 
option out, given the fact that CLMV are obliged to achieve full liberalization under AFTA/ATIGA by 
                                                     
62 The ADB’s Regional Integration Centre’s Comparative FTA Toolkit can be accessed at 
http://aric.adb.org/comparisonftacontent.php. 
63 Medalla, Erlinda M. (2010): Taking Stock of the ROOs in the ASEAN+1 FTAs: Toward Deepening East Asian 
Integration, Jae Lee, Chang & Okabe, Misa (eds.): ‘Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East 
Asia’, ERIA Research Project Report No. 26 
64 Zhang & Shen (2011): op. cit. p11 
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2015, which is much earlier than the end of CLMV’s transition periods under ASEAN+1 PTAs. As 
such, in the area of tariff commitments, ASEAN member states remain highly consolidated among 
themselves vis-à-vis the external partner. 
We have noted above that ASEAN member states have so far not multilateralized AFTA/ATIGA 
preferences on about 10% of tariff lines yet. This amount of tariff lines allows for plenty of policy 
space to shield sensitive sectors by means of tariff peaks. The remaining effective preferences set 
strong incentives for ASEAN+1 partner countries to attain tariff preferences through PTAs that 
resemble ASEAN internal preferences granted under AFTA / ATIGA, i.e. a full tariff elimination for 
almost 100% of tariff lines, which is the current status quo for the ASEAN-6 and will be achieved by 
CLMV by 2015. 
Table 11 presents the tariff elimination coverage under all ASEAN+1 PTAs by country at the end of 
the respective implementation period as specified by each agreement. Overall, we can observe that 
none of the five PTAs, on average, comes close to meeting the AFTA/ATIGA benchmark of tariff 
elimination on more than 99% of tariff lines. In some instance, however, ASEAN member states 
match (or almost match) their AFTA/ATIGA reduction commitments. 
 
Table 11: Tariff Elimination Coverage under ASEAN’s PTAs 
 
Source: Kuno, Arata (2010): Constructing the Tariff Dataset for the ERIA FTA Database, in: Jae Lee, Chang & Okabe, Misa 
(eds.): ‘Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia’, ERIA Research Project Report No. 26 
  
 ASEAN-
Korea 
ASEAN-
China 
ASEAN-
AUS-NZ 
ASEAN-
India 
ASEAN-
Japan 
Average 
Singapore 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Brunei 97.8% 97.9% 98.5% 82.6% 96.4% 94.6% 
Malaysia 93.5% 93.7% 95.5% 79.6% 92.1% 90.9% 
Thailand 93.7% 88.3% 98.8% 74.3% 96.9% 90.4% 
Indonesia 90.3% 89.0% 93.4% 50.4% 88.7% 82.3% 
Philippines 97.9% 86.5% 94.8% 75.8% 96.0% 90.2% 
Vietnam 84.3% n/a 90.9% 69.7% 84.7% 82.4% 
Cambodia 85.5% 86.7% 86.2% 84.1% 76.0% 83.7% 
Laos 85.4% 96.4% 90.7% 77.5% 84.2% 86.8% 
Myanmar 87.5% 86.9% 86.1% 73.6% 79.4% 82.7% 
ASEAN ∅ 91.6% 91.7% 93.5% 76.7% 89.4% 88.4% 
       
Korea 92.2%      
China  94.6%     
Australia   100.0%    
N. Zealand   100.0%    
India    74.3%   
Japan     86.3%  
       
Average 91.6% 92.0% 94.6% 76.5% 89.2%  
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ASEAN PTAs with Australia / New Zealand, China, and Korea are ambitious, with average 
elimination commitments on well above 90% of tariff lines. The ASEAN-Japan PTA comes close but 
just fails to meet the 90% benchmark. The tariff commitments under the ASEAN-India PTA, in 
contrast, with an average of below 80% of tariff lines liberalized, lack any commercial value 
whatsoever and are clearly not consistent with the ‘substantially all trade’ requirement of GATT 
Article XXIV. 
It is beyond doubt that four out of five ASEAN+1 PTAs (with the exception of the ASEAN-India 
PTA) significantly bite into the remaining effective AFTA/ATIGA preferences, i.e. those 
AFTA/ATIGA tariff preferences that have not been multilateralized yet. This is particularly so with 
regard to the commitments made by ASEAN-6 countries. ASEAN-6 tariff concessions are particularly 
ambitious in case of the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA and the ASEAN-Korea PTA. In case 
of the ASEAN-China PTA, we observe that Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines have taken a 
considerably more cautious approach to opening their markets to import competition from their 
neighboring economic giant. Among the ASEAN-6 countries, Indonesia – as one of the poorer 
ASEAN-6 members - is the most cautious in terms of market opening to ASEAN+1 external partners. 
CLVM’s tariff commitments, moreover, remain significantly below ASEAN-6 commitments. To 
provide a comparator, CLMV commitments, on average, still exceed the 80% liberalization 
requirement imposed by the EU on its African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) partner countries in 
context of Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. 
What is surprising, initially, is Japan’s relatively low liberalization commitment under its PTA with 
ASEAN. One way of explaining the relatively low tariff line coverage is to assume that Japan 
deliberately held back additional concessions vis-à-vis all ASEAN member states in order to retain 
bargaining chips for the negotiation of separate and parallel PTAs with seven more advanced ASEAN 
member states. Another reading of Japan’s limited tariff commitment vis-à-vis ASEAN member states 
emphasizes Japan’s notorious protection of large parts of its agricultural sector. While comprehensive 
PTA tariff coverage data is not readily available with regard to Japan, indicative evidence suggests 
that Japan’s commitment level in the ASEAN-Japan PTA can be explained by a combination of both 
of the rationales that we have outlined above. The Japan-Malaysia PTA, for instance, liberalizes 
88.7% of Japanese tariff lines.65 The Japan-Philippines PTA eliminates duties on 89.64% of tariff lines 
by the end of its implementation period.66 In other words, Japan has made concessions in its bilateral 
PTAs with Malaysia and the Philippines that exceed those that Japan extended in context of the 
plurilateral PTA with ASEAN members collectively, but still retains a considerable sectoral carve-out 
to provide for the protection of Japan’s agribusinesses. Similarly, Japan’s counterparts in these two 
agreements are reported to have made tariff concessions that exceed those extended in context of the 
ASEAN-Japan PTA. 
Despite the solid market access commitments in four out of five ASEAN+1 PTAs, the figures 
presented in Table 11 indicate that there remains, compared to ASEAN’s internal preferences, a 
significant potential for future liberalization vis-à-vis the external partners, which may take place in 
either a bilateral or plurilateral setting. 
In fact, tariff lines that have not been subject to reduction commitments yet – which is where the bulk 
of protection is usually hidden - likely set incentives for Korea’s ongoing PTA negotiations with 
Indonesia and Viet Nam and Australia’s talks with Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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Table 12 underlines this point by presenting the share of tariff lines, which have not been committed to 
elimination under at least one of the five ASEAN+1 PTAs yet. The ASEAN average share of 25.8% of 
tariff lines that have not been liberalized under at least one PTA indicates that ASEAN member states 
carefully select the products that they do not wish to expose to competition, depending on the external 
partner - even if this figure is inflated by ASEAN member states’ low commitment levels in the 
ASEAN-India PTA. All countries, except Brunei and Singapore, moreover, shield their most sensitive 
sectors under all five ASEAN+1 PTAs behind tariff peaks on a very narrow range of tariff lines. 
 
Table 12:  Distribution of Tariff Lines by Liberalization Status 
 
Source: Kuno, Arata (2010): Constructing the Tariff Dataset for the ERIA FTA Database, in: Jae Lee, Chang & Okabe, Misa 
(eds.): ‘Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia’, ERIA Research Project Report No. 26 
 
Three out of the five ASEAN+1 PTAs provide for binding provisions on customs.67 ASEAN’s PTAs 
with China and Korea only broadly include customs as a field of economic cooperation. The ASEAN-
India PTA reaffirms the WTO and ASEAN status quo - notably the applicability of the WTO Customs 
Valuation Agreement. The ASEAN-India PTA further refers to the desirability of harmonizing 
customs procedures with international standards where possible, and the simplification of customs 
procedures. 
The ASEAN-Australia/New Zealand, in contrast, breaks new ground in terms of ASEAN member 
states’ external commitments in this area in that it provides for an elaborate chapter applying to 
customs procedures and facilitation; customs cooperation; the use of automated systems; the 
reaffirmation of the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation; advance rulings; the prioritization of 
low-risk goods; the establishment of enquiry points; as well as importers’ rights to review and appeal. 
The disciplines present a combination of hard and soft law, whereas the more general provisions 
display hard, and the more specific rules soft legal language. While these disciplines do go beyond the 
provisions of the 1997 ASEAN Agreement on Customs (especially in the areas of advance rulings, 
risk management, and use of automated systems), they are on par with ATIGA’s chapters on trade 
                                                     
67 For an overview of common trade facilitation and customs disciplines in PTAs, see: Maur, Jean-Christophe 
(2011): Trade Facilitation, in: Chauffour, Jean-Pierre & Maur, Jean-Christophe (eds.): ‘Preferential Trade 
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 % of ‘eliminated to 
all’ products 
% of ‘depends on 
FTA’ products 
% of ‘protected to 
all’ products 
Brunei 84.1 15.9 0.0 
Cambodia 64.3 35.3 0.4 
Indonesia 46.0 52.8 1.2 
Laos 68.0 31.6 0.4 
Malaysia 76.0 22.9 1.1 
Myanmar 66.6 31.8 1.6 
Philippines 74.6 24.4 1.0 
Singapore 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Thailand 75.6 24.3 0.1 
Vietnam 78.1 19.1 2.8 
    
Average 73.3 25.8 0.9 
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facilitation and customs, which upgraded and modernized ASEAN’s internal integration commitments 
in this area in 2010. 
The ASEAN-Japan PTA merely reaffirms the provisions of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement 
and includes some aspirational and vague language applying to the simplification and harmonization 
of procedures as well as transparency. Each and every separate PTA under review, which Japan has 
concluded with individual ASEAN member states, goes beyond the provisions of the ASEAN-Japan 
PTA in terms of scope, level of detail, and enforceability of the legal language employed. For instance, 
all agreements contain hard legal provisions on transparency and the harmonization and simplification 
of procedures, while some agreements codify hard legal disciplines on goods in transit, exchange of 
information, cooperation between customs authorities, the use of information technology, and refer to 
the applicability of international conventions, but do not, however, go beyond the ASEAN status quo 
as consolidated by ATIGA. The Japan-Malaysia PTA, which contains the most extensive rules on 
customs matters, additionally mandates capacity building measures and establishes a bilateral sub-
committee on customs procedures.  
Four out of five of the agreements contain binding provisions on SPS and TBT measures.68 China 
remains the exception and merely denotes SPS and TBT as areas of cooperation in the 2002 ASEAN-
China Framework Agreement. A result of ASEAN-China cooperation, the parties, in 2009, agreed on 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on strengthening cooperation in the field of standards, 
technical regulations, and conformity assessment. The agreements with India and Korea only reaffirm 
the rights and obligations provided for in the WTO SPS and TBT agreements and, in case of the 
ASEAN-Korea PTA, establish a sub-committee for further cooperation. 
The ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA, in contrast, contains elaborate chapters on SPS and TBT 
issues, which go far beyond WTO obligations. Generally speaking, the covered disciplines govern 
conformity assessment procedures; standards; technical regulations; the application of SPS measures; 
transparency; the establishment of contact points and joint committees and their respective mandate; 
areas of further cooperation; exchange of information; consultations; as well as modalities for the 
negotiation of mutual recognition and equivalence agreements and arrangements. The agreement 
thereby strongly formalizes cooperation on SPS and TBT issues and makes for a solid starting point 
for actual regulatory convergence. In the process of implementing the respective provisions, ASEAN 
members and their institutions are likely to be able to draw from the experience of internal cooperation 
and integration initiatives in the past decade. This process has been legally advanced and disciplined 
by several ASEAN agreements on conformity assessment, harmonized regulatory regimes, and the 
integration of priority sectors, which have been integrated in ATIGA’s state-of-the-art chapters on 
standards, technical regulations, conformity assessment procedures, and sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. Nevertheless, the intensity of cooperation that is required to achieve compliance and the 
stated policy objectives in the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA will likely present the 
institutions of the lesser-developed ASEAN members with highly demanding tasks, as MRAs with 
developed economies tend to require a significant upgrade of the quality control infrastructure in lesser 
developed countries. 
The ASEAN-Japan PTA chapters on TBT and SPS resemble the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand 
PTA in their scope but – importantly - lack the stated ambition of negotiating MRAs or equivalence 
agreements in both areas. Japan’s parallel PTAs with individual ASEAN members only contain 
additional SPS provisions in two cases (Malaysia and Viet Nam), whereas these disciplines are 
identical to the rules contained in the ASEAN-Japan agreement. 
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On TBT issues, however, several of the individual accords make big leaps forward on the path towards 
regulatory convergence and go far beyond the WTO and ASEAN status quo as well as the ASEAN-
Japan PTA. The Japan-Malaysia PTA, for instance, calls for the harmonization of technical 
regulations; positive consideration to the equivalence of technical regulations of the other party; 
official justification in case of denial; positive consideration towards the acceptance of conformity 
assessment procedures of the other party; and lays down detailed modalities for the negotiation of 
MRAs on conformity assessment. Japan’s PTAs with the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, 
however, have already arrived at a much more advanced stage in the convergence process. All three 
agreements establish highly specific and detailed substantive disciplines, which oblige the parties to 
recognize the certificates of conformity assessment of the respective other party. The Japan-Indonesia 
PTA (no rules on TBT at all) and the Japan-Viet Nam PTA (identical to the TBT chapter in the 
ASEAN-Japan PTA) remain notable exceptions. 
All agreements under review reaffirm the right of the signatories to impose AD, CVM, and global 
safeguard measures that are consistent with the respective WTO agreements.69 Moreover, all of 
ASEAN’s external PTAs contain highly detailed provisions on the imposition of bilateral safeguard 
measures in the event of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry, caused by 
increased quantities of imports of a good that is subject to preferential tariff treatment. None of the 
ASEAN+1 agreements include any provisions on export taxes. Only Japan’s separate agreements 
with the Philippines and Singapore provide for such disciplines, which are aspirational in case of the 
former and legally binding (i.e. prohibitive) in case of the latter PTA. Overall, the trade defence 
instruments codified in our PTA sample do not exceed the scope or level of sophistication of the 
ATIGA treatment of such instruments. Export taxes remain the exception, as this measure is not 
provided for under the ATIGA provisions. Finally, a feature of great significance of the ASEAN-
China PTA is the granting of market economy status by ASEAN members to China, which has 
important implications for the calculation of AD margins and marks an important concession on behalf 
of ASEAN member states. 
All five ASEAN+1 PTAs contain provisions on services liberalization.70 However, only the joint 
agreement with Australia and New Zealand establishes a GATS Article V free services trade area. 
ASEAN’s PTAs with China, Japan, Korea, and India only mandate negotiations towards this end. 
ASEAN and China have so far concluded two commitment packages (in 2007 and 2011) on services 
liberalization under the 2002 Framework Agreement. ASEAN and Korea, in 2007, concluded the 
Agreement on Trade in Services under the respective ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement. ASEAN 
currently negotiates services agreements with both India and Japan, which are reported to near 
finalization in early 2013.71  
Compared with the GATS status quo, none of the agreements provide for major rule innovations with 
regard to trade in services. To the contrary, all of the agreements draw extensively from GATS legal 
language. In addition, the ASEAN-Korea accord contains an annex on financial services. The ASEAN 
– Australia / New Zealand PTA, furthermore, includes an additional chapter on the movement of 
natural persons and annexes on financial services and telecommunications. 
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The liberalization schedules of these three agreements contain individual country specific 
commitments, which differ heavily across countries. This implies that negotiations remain based on 
the request-offer approach among individual countries, similar to WTO services negotiations. Given 
the plurilateral character of the ASEAN+1 agreements, commitments codified in signatories’ 
schedules benefit all signatories. As such, any commitment that is made by an ASEAN member state 
not only benefits the external party but applies to ASEAN member states inter se. 
The ASEAN Secretariat notes that the AFAS commitment packages have set an important benchmark 
for ASEAN’s external negotiation partners as the latter seek to level the playing field by means of 
obtaining AFAS-like concessions for their services providers. On the other hand, the Secretariat 
observes that particular sector specific commitments made by certain ASEAN member states vis-à-vis 
external partners, which go beyond the AFAS status quo, create ASEAN-internal pressures to make 
concessions in these very sectors in future negotiation rounds under AFAS.72 
The Secretariat’s argument is only valid for the separate and parallel PTAs that individual ASEAN 
member states negotiate with external partners, but not for ASEAN+1 agreements, because the latter 
already extend all commitments contained in individual schedules to all signatories, whereas the 
former (in absence of MFN clauses in AFAS and all of the ASEAN+1 services PTAs) grant exclusive 
commitments to the two partner countries. Therefore, any concession made by an ASEAN member 
state under an ASEAN+1 services agreement that is more liberal than the AFAS status quo would de 
facto alter the AFAS status quo, i.e. ASEAN member states’ services commitments vis-à-vis each 
other, to a more liberal standard. 
However, from a negotiator’s point of view, the plurilateral setting in fact discourages ASEAN 
member states from making commitments that they have so far not extended to other ASEAN 
members under AFAS. Plurilateral agreements allow for ‘free-riding’ of those parties that do not 
partake in, or contribute to a specific bargain and exchange of concessions among a narrower set of 
negotiating parties. Separate PTAs between one ASEAN member and the external partner, on the 
other hand, foreclose the option of free-riding, increase the value of concessions through exclusivity, 
and would thus result in deeper and broader commitments than ASEAN+1 PTAs. 
It is interesting, in this context, that Japan has opted for the conclusion of services agreements as part 
of every single one of its seven separate PTAs with individual ASEAN members, rather than choosing 
the ASEAN+1 approach first. Our contention is that Japan and its ASEAN partners chose this option 
because separate services agreements allow for exclusivity of concessions, hence a greater value of 
concessions at the negotiation table, and result in deeper and broader commitments. The inclusion of 
MFN clauses in several of Japan’s separate accords with individual member states does indicate that 
the parties to these agreements are aiming for a more comprehensive approach to services 
liberalization, even if ASEAN members attach broad exemptions to the their MFN obligations vis-à-
vis Japan (for instance by excluding MFN applicability to AFAS concessions per se or by making 
broad sectoral exemptions). 
Table 13 presents the ‘Hoekman Index’73 scores, i.e. average services commitment level data, of six 
ASEAN member states under AFAS, under ASEAN’s PTAs with Australia and New Zealand, China, 
and Korea, as well as under the their individual PTAs with Japan. 74 
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73 The ‘Hoekman Index’ is an indexation method for measuring GATS-style commitment levels in service 
sectors. This method assigns values to each of 8 cells (4 modes of services supply and 2 aspects of liberalization 
- market access (MA) and National Treatment (NT)-), as follows: N=1, L=0.5, U=0; then calculates the average 
value by services sector and by country. Ishido (2010) has calculated the “Hoekman Index” for each of 55 sub-
sectors for four ASEAN PTAs and six PTAs that Japan has concluded with individual ASEAN member states. 
The author then calculated the simple average at the level of the 55 sub-sectors. The results are presented in 
Table 11. 
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Table 13: ‘Hoekman Index’: Services Commitment Levels in ASEAN’s PTAs 
 
Source: Ishido, Hikari (2010): Liberalization of Trade in Services under ASEAN+n and Bilaterals: A Mapping Exercise, in: 
Jae Lee, Chang & Okabe, Misa (eds.): ‘Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia’, ERIA Research Project 
Report No. 26 
Note: The Hoekman Index score for Japan’s commitment level under its six separate PTAs with individual ASEAN member 
states is calculated as the simple average of Japan’s commitments for each of the six PTAs. 
 
The results demonstrate that none of the ASEAN+1 plurilateral PTAs exceeds, on average, the AFAS 
status quo of services trade and investment liberalization. Ishido (2010) also finds that ASEAN 
member states have not only made their strongest average services trade commitments under AFAS, 
but that ASEAN member states’ commitments under ASEAN+1 PTAs in individual sub-sectors do not 
exceed the AFAS benchmark in a single instance. In other words, ASEAN+1 PTAs do not change the 
AFAS status quo. In contrast, ASEAN member states appear to be highly consolidated among 
themselves. In fact, Ishido (2010) finds significant sector specific similarities (i.e. high correlations) 
among ASEAN member states’ commitments made in context of the three ASEAN+1 plurilateral 
agreements on services trade. 
Among the ASEAN+1 plurilateral agreements, the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA ranks first 
in terms of the average strength of ASEAN member states’ commitments; ASEAN-Korea ranks 
second, and ASEAN-China, with a significantly lower average commitment level of ASEAN 
members, ranks fourth – mirroring the ranking order of trade intensity scores of ASEAN as a whole 
with its external partners (see section IV). 
The aggregate average commitment level of six ASEAN member states under their separate PTAs 
with Japan is higher than under any ASEAN+1 agreement, but lower than under AFAS. For some 
individual ASEAN member states, however, the individual average commitment level under the PTAs 
with Japan approximates (Vietnam, Philippines) or exceeds (Singapore) their average commitment 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Exercise, in: Jae Lee, Chang & Okabe, Misa (eds.): ‘Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East 
Asia’, ERIA Research Project Report No. 26.  
 
AFAS ASEAN-AUS / NZ 
ASEAN-
China 
ASEAN- 
Korea 
Six 
Individual 
ASEAN 
MS-Japan 
Indonesia 0.35 0.16 0.04 0.18 0.14 
Malaysia 0.31 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.12 
Philippines 0.29 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.27 
Singapore 0.36 0.32 0.23 0.31 0.44 
Thailand 0.46 0.22 0.06 n/a 0.15 
Vietnam 0.33 0.32 0.03 0.31 0.33 
      
ASEAN 0.33 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.24 
      
NZ  0.39    
AUS  0.38    
China   0.13   
Korea    0.28  
Japan     0.50 
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level under AFAS. Moreover, Ishido (2010) found that all of these six ASEAN member states 
extended, in their separate PTAs with Japan, commitments that exceed their AFAS obligations in 
some individual sub-sectors, which confirms the hypotheses that we have developed above. 
 
None of the ASEAN+1 accords include any substantive rules or cooperation clauses applying to 
government procurement.75 This complete lack of legal treatment mirrors the ASEAN status quo in 
this area. Public procurement remains entirely outside of the scope of ASEAN cooperation and legal 
integration efforts and is not even mentioned in the 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint.76 
Singapore, up until today, remains the only ASEAN signatory to the WTO’s Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA). 
In contrast, all but one (Japan-Malaysia PTA) of Japan’s PTAs with individual ASEAN members 
include government procurement provisions, which mostly manifest, however, the ambition of the 
parties to exchange information on government procurement rules and regulations, to enhance the 
transparency of their respective systems, and to cooperate on related issues in the future. For these 
purposes, Japan’s PTAs with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand establish sub-committees. 
Japan’s PTA with the Philippines, remarkably, includes a legally binding and mandate for time-bound 
future negotiations on government procurement market access liberalization. Japan’s PTA with 
Singapore, finally, refers to the GPA, to which both countries are parties. 
In the area of intellectual property rights,77 only ASEAN’s PTAs with Korea as well as Australia 
and New Zealand contain binding provisions, while the PTAs with China and India, unsurprisingly, 
make no reference to intellectual property whatsoever. The ASEAN–Japan agreement includes IPR in 
its horizontal cooperation clause, but does not provide for any substantive disciplines. 
The ASEAN – Korea PTA merely reaffirms the parties’ obligations under the WTO TRIPs agreement. 
The ASEAN – Australia / New Zealand PTA devotes far more attention to this policy area by 
including a separate chapter on intellectual property rights. Its disciplines on copyrights, trademarks, 
and geographical indications as well as transparency contain, in terms of coverage, a few TRIPs-plus 
provisions, which, however, are predominantly framed in aspirational legal language, e.g. regarding 
the accession to TRIPs-plus IPR treaties or the effective legal protection against circumvention of 
technological measures used by copyright owners. An exception here is the hard legal TRIPs-plus 
obligation to maintain a trademark classification system consistent with the Nice Agreement. What is 
striking is the omission of any disciplines on procedural or administrative matters as well as 
enforcement in terms of border measures. The most important feature of the chapter, rather, is its 
highly detailed cooperation clause and the creation of a joint committee on IP issues. Once again, 
ASEAN’s external commitments in this area broadly reflects the ASEAN internal status quo, which 
comprises of an agreement on intellectual property cooperation, the ASEAN 2004-2010 IPR Action 
Plan, the Work Plan for ASEAN Cooperation on Copyrights, and, most importantly, each ASEAN 
member’s obligations under the WTO TRIPs agreement. 
Japan’s separate PTAs with ASEAN member states go beyond every ASEAN+1 agreement and, in 
some instances, contain binding TRIPs-plus provisions. The respective chapters provide for 
substantive and hard legal disciplines on patents, trademarks, industrial design, copyrights, protection 
of new plant varieties, geographical indications, enforcement in terms of border measures as well as 
                                                     
75 For an overview of common government procurement disciplines in PTAs, see: Dawar, Kamala & Evenett, 
Simon (2011): Government Procurement, in: Chauffour, Jean-Pierre & Maur, Jean-Christophe (eds.): 
‘Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development – A Handbook’, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
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civil and criminal remedies, transparency, and detailed rules on procedural matters. TRIPs-plus 
provisions can be found in the areas of procedural simplification (e.g. the obligation to apply an 
international classification system on patents as well as provisions relating to the publication of 
patents), the protection of trademarks, and enforcement (e.g. the prohibition to re-export goods 
infringing trademarks or copyrights). Moreover, the agreements establish sub-committees, which 
receive a detailed mandate to monitor, review, discuss, and cooperate on issues relating to the 
implementation of the chapters. The accords thereby create a solid TRIPS-plus legal framework and 
attach a bilateral cooperation mechanism between one of the main producers of intellectual property in 
the world and a set of developing countries with varying but generally low levels of IPR enforcement 
and enforcement capacity. As such, the level of ambition that is codified in most of Japan’s bilateral 
agreements does in fact go beyond ASEAN’s internal efforts, which merely focus on institutional 
capacity building and cooperation in this field. 
4. The Depth of WTO-extra Commitments in ASEAN’s PTAs 
In this subsection, we analyze the depth and institutional dimension of ASEAN+1 PTA commitments 
in select policy areas of the WTO-extra category. In doing so, we compare these commitments with 
the ASEAN acquis and the depth of commitments in six out of seven PTAs that individual ASEAN 
member states have concluded with Japan in parallel to the ASEAN-Japan PTA. We have selected 
those policy areas for examination where our sample of overall eleven PTAs provides for a sizeable 
number of enforceable commitments and therefore make a comparison useful. The areas under 
examination are competition policy, investment, as well as movement of natural persons (i.e. labor 
mobility). For this comparison, we have used the Comparative FTA Toolkit of the Asian Development 
Bank’s Regional Integration Center.78 
In the area of competition policy, the agreements under review do not provide for any major 
achievements.79 The PTAs with Australia / New Zealand and Japan are the only ASEAN+1 
agreements that in fact include any reference to competition policy at all. The PTA with Japan 
mentions competition policy as one among many areas of economic cooperation. Similarly, the 
competition chapter in the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA, in its four respective articles, does 
not contain any specific or legally binding obligations but, to the contrary, recognizes the diverse 
capacities of the parties to implement, maintain, as well as enforce competition laws and, on this basis, 
calls for a variety of cooperation and technical assistance activities. In this context, it should be 
remembered that, so far, only five ASEAN member states have enacted some kind of competition law 
- notably Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. The ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint calls, in aspirational language, for the enactment of competition laws in all ASEAN member 
states by 2015, which can be seen, as a matter of appropriate sequencing, as a prerequisite for 
cooperation on and integration of competition policies at the regional level. 
For a better comparison of ASEAN+1 agreements with regard to competition policy provisions, we 
observe, for instance, that the inter-regional EU-Cariforum EPA provides for legally binding and time-
bound disciplines, which require the establishment of competition authorities and the enactment of 
competition laws in all Caricom member states, as well as the formulation of regional competition 
regulations, which are to be enforced by the already existing regional Cariforum competition 
authority. Through these provisions, the EPA reinforces the obligations that are already provided for in 
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the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, whereas the EPA adds political clout and positive incentives - 
notably capacity building and technical assistance guarantees – to the intraregional treaty. 
Japan’s separate PTAs with individual ASEAN members, which all contain a miniscule competition 
chapter, go a little further than the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA by calling upon the 
signatories - in hard but the broadest possible legal language - to address ‘anti-competitive activities’ 
through the adoption of ‘appropriate’ laws and regulations. Similarly vague provisions are devoted to 
the principle of non-discrimination, procedural fairness, promotion of competition, cooperation, and 
technical assistance. 
Remarkable achievements, however, can be reported in the area of investment protection and 
liberalization, which can be seen as a key ingredient to a policy framework that provides for the legal 
security and expansion of regional production networks.80 Investment, it should be recalled, is one of 
the four ‘Singapore Issues’, which were dropped from the WTO Doha Round negotiation agenda at 
the 2003 Cancun Ministerial due to heavy opposition from developing countries. 
In early 2009, ASEAN consolidated and significantly expanded previous intra-regional investment 
accords by concluding the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, which, as a modern state-
of-the-art investment treaty, covers investment protection, liberalization, facilitation, promotion, and 
transparency of investment rules and regulations. The conclusion of investment accords under the 
respective framework agreements with China and Korea followed promptly in the same year. 
Moreover, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand included a comprehensive investment chapter in their 
2010 PTA. India and Japan, on the other hand, are still negotiating investment agreements with 
ASEAN, whereas Japan has either already included investment liberalization, protection, and 
promotion chapters in its separate PTAs with seven individual ASEAN member states, or, in case of 
Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam, concluded separate investment liberalization and protection 
agreements. 
While a comprehensive and detailed comparison of investment rules and coverage under existent 
ASEAN+1 PTAs, the separate PTAs with Japan, as well as their reservations, would exceed the scope 
of this paper, we summarize a number of common features and differences below. 
As a matter of simplicity, we start with the most important difference that distinguishes the ASEAN-
China investment agreement from all other accords, notably the fact that it does not extend its national 
treatment provision to ‘establishment’ and therefore only governs investment protection, but not pre-
establishment liberalization, which reportedly resulted from the reluctance of the Chinese 
government.81 Furthermore, the ASEAN-China agreement includes a provision, which exempts all 
‘existing or new non-conforming measures’ from the scope of national treatment and MFN and 
thereby entirely erodes those two disciplines. 
All of the agreements take a broad asset-based approach to the definition of investment, which is 
generally inclusive. Secondly, all agreements – except the Japan-Thailand PTA - use a negative list 
approach, which implies that the substantive disciplines of the agreements apply to any sector or sub-
sector that is not expressly exempted, or included in a list of reservations annexed to the accord or the 
respective PTA chapter. 
Generally speaking, the investment chapters and investment agreements in our sample commonly 
encompass all features of modern NAFTA-style investment accords, including provisions on the 
                                                     
80 For an overview of common investment disciplines in PTAs, see: Miroudot, Sebastien (2011): Investment, in: 
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prohibition of performance requirements; fair and equitable treatment; compensation in case of strife; 
transfers; expropriation and compensation; subrogation; general and security exceptions; reservations; 
modification of commitments; denial of benefits; transparency; state-to-state disputes; investor-state 
disputes; and institutional arrangements establishing a committee that deals with issues arising under 
these provisions. 
As noted above, all but the ASEAN-China investment agreement allow, in principle, for the 
application of national treatment provisions to pre-establishment, subject to sectoral and sub-sectoral 
reservation lists. More variety, however, can be found in regard of most-favored nation clauses. 
Among the plurilateral accords in our sample, only the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement itself confers an unconditional MFN status to the signatories, notwithstanding the lists of 
sectoral and sub-sectoral reservations. As mentioned above, the ASEAN-China agreement includes an 
MFN provision that is essentially hollow. The MFN clause in the ASEAN-Korea investment 
agreement, moreover, is highly conditional. It excludes from its scope all preferential treatment 
granted under any already existing PTA or regional agreement, as well as any preferential treatment 
granted under existing or future agreements between and among ASEAN member states. The 
ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand investment chapter does not grant MFN treatment in a binding 
manner at all. In contrast, we do find unconditional MFN clauses in four separate PTAs that Japan has 
negotiated with individual ASEAN member states. The agreements with Singapore and Thailand do 
not contain such clauses. 
On this basis, we conclude that, following the coming into force of the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement, ASEAN’s investment agreement / chapter with Korea as well as Australia and 
New Zealand have broken new ground by establishing deep and comprehensive investment protection 
and liberalization disciplines, whereas the ASEAN-China investment agreement is limited to 
investment protection. Japan has, prior to the ASEAN-internal investment agreement, secured separate 
comprehensive protection and liberalization chapters and agreements with nine out of ten individual 
ASEAN member states. Through the, in principle, unconditional granting of MFN status, most of 
these agreements and investment chapters appear, on their surface, to provide for more beneficial 
treatment than the ASEAN+1 accords, notwithstanding respective reservation lists. 
Similar to the areas of tariff reduction commitments as well as services trade liberalization, we find it 
highly likely that the exclusivity of concessions provided by Japan’s bilateral agreements would result 
in deeper commitments than the plurilateral agreements, which cannot foreclose the option of free-
riding on specific bargains among a smaller number of negotiating parties and the resulting 
concessions. Due to the limited scope of this paper, however, we cannot conduct a comprehensive 
comparison of the respective reservation lists to verify this hypothesis. 
The ASEAN+1 PTA with Australia and New Zealand is the only one of the five plurilateral 
agreements that provides for disciplines on the liberalization of the movement of natural persons, i.e. 
mode 4 services liberalization.82 The inclusion of such disciplines can be interpreted as an important 
concession on behalf of Australia and New Zealand, which has likely been traded against ASEAN 
concessions in other areas of the agreement. The respective chapter covers provisions applying to the 
transparency of regulations and administration and applies to the temporary entry of business visitors, 
investors, intracorporate transferees, contractual services suppliers, and spouses, which are, apart from 
the last one, the standard categories of temporary entry liberalization in PTAs. The country-specific 
commitments and attached conditions with regard to these worker categories (such as limitations on 
the length of stay or educational requirements) are codified in an annex to the agreement. The 
commitments made by Australia and New Zealand are much more liberal than those of ASEAN 
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member states, both in terms of the number of professional categories that are covered and the length 
of stay that is permitted.83 
Japan has opted, once more, for the inclusion of respective disciplines in context of its PTAs with 
individual ASEAN member states rather than the ASEAN-Japan PTA. Japan’s agreements with 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Viet Nam contain distinct chapters on the 
movement of natural persons, which, in their structure, resemble the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand 
PTA. Japan’s PTAs, in addition, establish sub-committees that are mandated to deal with the 
implementation of the chapters and the negotiation of further commitments in the future. Moreover, 
the provisions of Japan’s PTAs deviate from the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA in terms of 
scope (covered worker categories), specific commitments (liberalized categories of professionals), and 
conditions (length of stay; educational requirements) that are attached to scheduled commitments. As 
in the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA, commitments are much more comprehensive on the side 
of the developed country party. In the PTAs with Indonesia and the Philippines, for instance, Japan’s 
commitments with regard to length of stay and coverage of professional categories are considerably 
more liberal than the commitments of the respective other party. In essence, the mode 4 concessions 
made by Japan apply to the temporary entry of nurses and care-workers from abroad.84 
VI. Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications 
Our findings, presented in the previous section, fully verify the hypotheses that we have developed in 
section IV, and which we have summarized in subsection 4 of section IV. 
The lowest common denominator of ASEAN member states’ highly heterogeneous policy preferences, 
which has shaped the depth and pace of ASEAN internal economic integration in the past two 
decades, is mirrored in the coverage and depth of PTA commitments that ASEAN member states have 
collectively negotiated and concluded with six external dialogue partners – notably China, Korea, 
Japan, India, as well as Australia and New Zealand. In other words, the lack of institutional and 
economic capacity of the least developed ASEAN member states to commit to certain market access 
or regulatory reforms is not only reflected in the ASEAN acquis, but similarly limits the coverage and 
depth of ASEAN+1 PTAs. Thus, not a single one of ASEAN+1 PTAs provides for greater coverage 
and depth of substantive and binding disciplines than the legal documents that establish the acquis of 
ASEAN internal de jure economic integration. 
This finding does not only hold true for policy areas where common PTA rules apply to all signatories 
equally, but similarly for those commitments, which can technically be differentiated among the 
signatories by means of country specific tariff reduction and services trade liberalization schedules. 
ASEAN member states have concluded ASEAN+1 PTAs in what can be called the ‘default mode’: it 
is not ASEAN as a legal entity but its individual member states, which are parties to ASEAN+1 PTAs. 
It is thus the member states, which are the individual subjects of the rights and obligations that the 
agreements extend. Hence, the fact that ASEAN+1 PTAs are plurilateral agreements in their legal 
nature implies that they create rights and obligations among all parties inter se. In theory, therefore, 
liberalization and integration disciplines in ASEAN+1 PTAs that are deeper and more comprehensive 
than ASEAN internal economic liberalization and integration disciplines could de facto alter 
ASEAN’s internal acquis to a more liberal standard. 
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At the same time, the plurilateral legal character of ASEAN+1 PTAs not only requires the negotiation 
of a lowest common denominator for PTA rules that apply to all eleven (or twelve) parties equally, but 
also forecloses the option of an exclusive exchange of (tariff, services, or investment) concessions 
between an ASEAN member state and the external partner in areas where differentiated commitments 
are possible. The plurilateral setting therefore discourages ASEAN member states commitments that 
are deeper than the ASEAN internal status quo because other ASEAN member states would free-ride 
on a specific bilateral exchange of concessions with the external partner. 
Our findings confirm this hypothesis: the plurilateral negotiation setting has prevented ASEAN 
member states from making concessions that go beyond the ASEAN internal status quo of integration 
and liberalization. This is not only the case with regard to common rules that apply among all parties 
inter se, but also in areas where ASEAN+1 PTAs provide for country specific commitments, i.e. in the 
areas of tariff reductions and services trade liberalization. We cannot, unfortunately, verify the validity 
of our hypothesis for the depth of ASEAN member states’ individual liberalization commitments in 
the area of investment, as a comprehensive analysis of respective National Treatment and MFN 
reservation lists of the agreements would exceed the scope of this paper. 
The important conclusion that we can draw from this finding is that ASEAN+1 PTAs do not have the 
legal effect of altering the depth of ASEAN’s internal de jure integration, which thus merely remains a 
theoretical legal possibility. To the contrary, the comparison of the depth of disciplines and 
commitments found in ASEAN+1 PTAs with those of the ASEAN acquis results in the conclusion 
that ASEAN member states remain highly consolidated among themselves vis-à-vis the external 
partners. As a result, we find that, despite the fact that ASEAN member states are, de jure, the 
individual subjects of rights and obligations under external PTAs, they act, de facto, collectively to the 
extent that their external commitments do not transcend the internal status quo. 
On a horizontal level, however, ASEAN’s PTAs with Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and Korea 
appear to be more comprehensive than the ASEAN acquis. This finding stems from the fact that these 
agreements comprise a variety of hard legal disciplines, which mandate economic cooperation 
activities in a wide range of policy areas. The provision for such ‘living agreement’ instruments, 
however, does not affect the current depth of de jure economic integration among the signatories, but 
rather serve the purpose of enhancing institutional and private sector capacity with a view to 
strengthening domestic institutional, regulatory, and economic structures in preparation for future 
legal integration initiatives. 
The merits of such economic cooperation provisions are highly contingent upon the strength of the 
respective mandates - i.e. their legal enforceability -, the institutional dimension attached to them, as 
well as upon provisions that govern the allocation of necessary resources. In other words, the 
substantive objectives that are codified in such disciplines require a solid institutional platform and a 
strong and detailed mandate in order to result in any tangible achievements in the future.  
In this regard, we find that ASEAN’s PTAs with Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and Korea satisfy 
the above-mentioned requirements, and therefore have a robust potential to render respective living 
agreement instruments fully operational and effective. Economic cooperation clauses in ASEAN’s 
PTAs with China and India, in contrast, fail this basic test in all respects. 
The proliferation of economic cooperation provisions in ASEAN+1 PTAs provides for additional 
evidence of the impact of the lowest common denominator negotiation principle that has shaped the 
depth of ASEAN+1 PTAs. Overall, we find that the agreements are characterized by a hard legal core 
of specific and enforceable substantive obligations in key policy areas, which is surrounded by a realm 
of living agreement instruments and/or soft law in areas where some of the signatories were not 
prepared to make additional substantive commitments, while other parties demanded a minimum 
standard of legal treatment and/or cooperation towards enhanced convergence in the future. 
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This dual approach of providing for, first, hard and specific legal disciplines in key policy areas and, 
second, economic cooperation and/or soft law aiming at further convergence in the future, is 
particularly plausible in the ASEAN context, where highly diverse institutional and private sector 
capacities to implement, administer, enforce, and comply with complex new regulatory and border 
regimes persist. In this way, ASEAN PTAs with external partners, and particularly with the developed 
economies among them, can contribute to and accelerate the process of ASEAN internal de jure and 
institutional integration, which, subsequently, can be extended to ASEAN’s external relationships. 
Overall, we find that the depth and coverage of ASEAN+1 PTAs corresponds to the level of trade 
intensity between ASEAN member states and external partners. Comparing the core of binding 
substantive disciplines and commitments of the five agreements, we find that ASEAN’s PTA with 
Australia and New Zealand is by far the most ambitious. The accord achieves the strongest mutual 
commitments in virtually all areas - and particularly so in the areas of tariff reductions, customs 
reform, TBT and SPS measures (mandating negotiations on conformity assessment MRAs), 
intellectual property rights, investment protection and liberalization, and the movement of natural 
persons. The depth and coverage of the agreement - notwithstanding the general limitations that we 
have discussed above – thereby gives justice to the intensity of existing trade between the two regions, 
which is the highest among ASEAN’s trade relationships with all external ASEAN+1 partners. 
Moreover, the ambition reflected by the agreement also gives an indication of Down Under’s 
geopolitical commitment to ASEAN member states as a collective, which is underlined by the fact that 
Australia and New Zealand make by far the strongest commitments among the signatories in terms of 
tariff and services trade liberalization as well as technical assistance and capacity building 
commitments. The fact that both Australia and New Zealand have recently concluded, or are in the 
process of negotiating, various separate PTAs with individual ‘high intensity’ trade partners among 
ASEAN member states, points at the fact, however, that the parties to the these parallel agreements are 
not willing to settle for the lowest common denominator among ASEAN members, both in terms of 
market access liberalization and behind-the-border disciplines. 
The ASEAN-Korea PTA codifies commitments, which approximate the ambition of the ASEAN-
Australia / New Zealand agreement in terms of tariff reductions, services liberalization, and the legal 
standard that it establishes for the protection and liberalization of investments. Mutual concessions are, 
however, more balanced than in the prior case. Moreover, the ASEAN-Korea accord dispenses with 
any binding and substantive WTO-plus legal treatment in other than the before-mentioned areas and is 
therefore more confined to the liberalization of merchandise and services trade as well as investments 
than the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA. Similar to Australia and New Zealand, Korea now 
negotiates parallel PTAs with the two ASEAN member states that it trades most intensively with in 
order to achieve ‘ASEAN-plus’ legal treatment in areas that matter most for businesses. 
The policy priorities mirrored in the ASEAN-China PTA reflect the low intensity of trade between 
China and ASEAN members: the agreements provides for robust merchandise trade liberalization – 
which can serve to revert a trend of decreasing trade intensity - but falls way short of matching the 
commitment levels of the previous two agreements in terms of services liberalization. Moreover, the 
ASEAN-China investment agreement does not include liberalization measures at all. 
The ASEAN-India PTA does not appear to create any additional commercial opportunities 
whatsoever. In fact, the accord stands in contradiction with GATT Article XXIV, which requires 
regional trade agreement to achieve a liberalization of ‘substantially all trade’ for it to be consistent 
with WTO legal disciplines. Moreover, the PTA does not contain any legal disciplines that exceed the 
current WTO status quo. We can only speculate over the motivations of this essentially hollow 
agreement. One way of explaining the extremely low tariff commitment levels are strong similarities 
of production structures, therefore a lack of complementarity of the respective economies, and, to the 
contrary, the existence of a competitive relationship between ASEAN and India in international 
merchandise trade. The case may be different in the area of services trade and investment, the 
Beyond Market Access? The Anatomy of ASEAN’s Preferential Trade Agreements 
47 
liberalization of which is currently under negotiation in the ASEAN-India context, and the outcome of 
which we cannot prejudge. 
Japan, finally, in apparent awareness of the limitations of the potency of the ‘ASEAN collective’ in 
trade and investment negotiations, has pursued a dual market access liberalization and economic 
integration strategy with ASEAN member states from the very beginning. On the one hand, Japan has 
concluded a PTA with ASEAN member states collectively, which is confined to robust merchandise 
trade liberalization and strong economic cooperation provisions. The seven parallel agreements, which 
Japan has concluded with individual ‘high-intensity’ trade partners among ASEAN member states 
resulted in what Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and now the European Union are likely attempting to 
achieve in their own negotiations with individual ASEAN member states – notably preferential trade 
agreements that contain elements of deep and comprehensive economic integration. 
The six separate Japanese accords that we have examined in this paper do not only exceed the depth 
and coverage of all five ASEAN+1 PTAs. They also extract commitments from the respective 
ASEAN partner country, which transcend the ASEAN internal status quo to a remarkable extent. The 
agreements thereby give further evidence to the impact of the lowest common denominator paradigm 
and the free-rider problem, which prevail in the ASEAN+1 plurilateral negotiation setting.  
The two of Japan’s seven separate and individual ASEAN member state PTAs for which we have 
found tariff coverage data exceed the average tariff commitments of all ASEAN+1 PTAs, including 
the ASEAN-Japan PTA. In the area of technical barriers to trade, Japan’s agreements with the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand require the mutual recognition of conformity assessments 
conducted or certified by the competent authorities of either party as of the date of entry into force. 
The other three Japanese agreements under review mandate negotiations towards this end. As the only 
agreement in our sample of overall eleven PTAs, the Japan-Singapore also outlaws the employment of 
export taxes. 
Moreover, the average services commitments of ASEAN member states under six out of seven of the 
parallel agreements with Japan exceed the average commitment levels of all ASEAN+1 PTAs and 
either remain below, match, or exceed the ASEAN internal average commitment level under AFAS. In 
certain individual services sub-sectors, all of the six ASEAN member states have made commitments 
that go beyond their AFAS concessions. 
Additionally, Japan’s parallel agreements provide for ‘ASEAN-plus’ legal treatment in the areas of 
government procurement, IPR (TRIPs-plus), and competition policy. The disciplines contained in 
Japan’s investment liberalization and protection chapters are, furthermore, more encompassing than 
those codified under ASEAN’s Comprehensive Investment Agreement and in ASEAN+1 PTAs as 
they include generally unconditional MFN clauses. Finally, most of the agreements provide for 
chapters on the liberalization of the movement of natural persons (mode-4 services supply), under 
which Japan makes particularly strong commitments with regard to the temporary entry and stay of 
nurses and care-workers in Japan. 
Our findings have several implications for ongoing and prospective negotiations of trade and 
investment agreements that involve ASEAN member states. 
First, ASEAN’s trade and investment partners should be well aware of the limits that the status quo of 
de jure ASEAN economic integration and the omnipresent free-rider problem impose upon ASEAN’s 
external liberalization and integration efforts - should these partners aim for the negotiation of deep 
and comprehensive PTAs with ASEAN member states collectively. This inclusive approach can 
certainly result, as is compellingly demonstrated by the ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand PTA, in 
commercially meaningful merchandise trade, services, and investment liberalization, and yield 
benefits for ASEAN’s regional integration process through economic cooperation, which will likely be 
extended to external partners in the long run. 
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Compared to the plurilateral ASEAN+1 setting, however, any bilateral agreement between a 
developed non-ASEAN economy, on the one hand, and an individual ASEAN member state, on the 
other, is likely to generate stronger commitments in these areas. The bilateral approach, moreover, 
allows for more comprehensive and rigorous legal treatment of other border and behind-the-border 
issues with a view to the elimination of second-generation trade and investment barriers. The bilateral 
approach, therefore, owns a much stronger potential to decrease the costs of 21st century trade among 
the partners and to render production networks more efficient and legally secure in the short run. 
Nevertheless, external partners that pursue a bilateral negotiation strategy with ASEAN member states 
individually should be under no illusion with regard to the significant differences that persist between 
the institutional and economic capacities of their ASEAN target partners. As such, PTA negotiations 
with, first, Brunei and Singapore; secondly, Malaysia and Thailand; and, third, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Viet Nam, will likely result in very different agreements in terms of their depth and 
comprehensiveness, given the distinct institutional and economic preparedness of these countries to 
sign up to bilateral commitments that require burdensome as well as costly (including politically) 
domestic reforms. 
The ‘dual approach’ taken by Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Korea, i.e. the negotiation of both a 
comprehensive but relatively shallow PTA with ASEAN member states, collectively, and bilateral 
PTAs with individual ‘high intensity’ ASEAN trade partners, separately, can maximize the aggregate 
benefits that these agreements can achieve in the short and in the long run. Given the European 
Union’s commitment to the negotiation of deep and comprehensive PTAs under its ‘Global Europe’ 
strategy, as well as its commitment to regional integration and economic development of ASEAN, 
European leaders will have eventually no choice but to follow a similar path. 
Secondly, the creation of ASEAN-minus commitments in ASEAN+1 PTAs, on the one hand, and 
ASEAN-plus commitments in individual ASEAN member states’ PTAs with external partners, on the 
other, will likely result in competitive tensions among the ASEAN membership, which are geared 
towards the extension of ASEAN-plus concessions to the other ASEAN members. This competitive 
liberalization dynamic can result in the acceleration of ASEAN internal liberalization and integration 
efforts. At this stage, this is most apparent in the area of services trade liberalization, which is where 
ASEAN member states have the largest upward potential. 
Our study provides, third, for strong indications of what can be expected from the recently announced 
ASEAN+6 PTA talks, if these negotiations do not allow for variable geometry to tackle what we have 
described as the lowest common denominator issue among a set of highly heterogeneous actors, as 
well as the free-rider problem that persists in plurilateral negotiation settings. In other words, if multi-
speed liberalization and integration is not allowed for under the negotiation’s modus operandi, the 
ASEAN+6 PTA are unlikely to result in anything more than market access liberalization, which will 
be less ambitious than any parallel bilateral agreement, and therefore generate few if any additional 
commercial opportunities. The added value of such an accord, however, could lie in the harmonization 
of the rules of origin that apply to a substantial share of already liberalized tariff lines and thereby 
reduce transaction costs for businesses by disentangling parts of the Asian ‘noodle bowl’. 
These considerations lead us to a final point, which concerns what has recently been discussed as a 
potential rivalry between ASEAN+n economic integration initiatives and the ongoing negotiations that 
are leading up to a Transpacific Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). In our view, this ‘rivalry’ is 
an illusory scenario. Both initiatives, as a function of their distinct membership composition, will 
result in very different substantive depth and coverage of commitments. The membership of the TPP 
comprises a set of eleven advanced emerging and developed economies, which all benefit from 
relatively robust economic and institutional structures and can build on a rich experience of trade 
reform and negotiations. These common characteristics have the potential to enable TPP negotiating 
parties, even in the given plurilateral setting, to achieve deep disciplines that tackle second-generation 
trade barriers across the region in a comprehensive manner. As we have demonstrated, ASEAN 
member states collectively lack such enabling characteristics at this point in time. As a result, 
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ASEAN+n and the TPP provide benefits in very different areas, with an emphasis on market access 
liberalization for goods, services, and investment in case of the former and disciplines on complex 
border and behind-the-border regimes in case of the latter.  
The overlapping membership of the two initiatives may lead to a spill-over of deep integration 
disciplines from the TPP to ASEAN+n at a later point in time, rather than two regimes that compete 
for application and effectiveness in the same policy areas. Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Viet Nam are parties to both negotiation initiatives and may, following the 
development of deep-integration provisions under the umbrella of the TPP, carry such disciplines - 
through economic cooperation and further negotiations of intra-ASEAN and ASEAN+n legal 
agreements - into areas of prospective ASEAN and ASEAN+n economic integration. It is worth 
noting, in this context, that this scenario would leave the European Union with little, if any, influence 
with regard to the directions of East Asian and Asia-Pacific economic integration in the future. 
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